Adrienne Pine
Official Communique of the Olancho Environmental Movement
It is with deep sadness that we are informing the Honduran and international community of the murder of our companero Adalberto Figueroa. This morning, Saturday the 8th of May at about the 8:30 a.m., when he was getting ready to collect firewood in the company of his 11-year-old son and his nephew, barely a kilometre from his house, he was ambushed by people wearing ski masks. They fired several shots which killed him immediately.
Adalberto was an unquestionable leader inside and outside his community, who always had an extraordinary sense of solidarity and was utterly committed to social causes. He was a directive member of our organisation; initially he was our spokesperson. He was committed to the environmental struggle and participated in most activities organised by the Environmentalist Movement of Olancho (MAO). He was the coordinator of the environmental movement in the Municipality of Guata and most recently a council member in this municipality. In addition to the environmental struggle and his incursion into politics, he was a leader in his community as a delegate of the word of God.
Today we are sad and outraged that to this day 9 environmentalist companeros have been assassinated with impunity. We have denounced these murders over and over again, but the authorities of our country do not pay any attention. We understand that behind the Honduran justice system is the power of companies who dictate the rules that must be followed and who decide who has to be persecuted. Adalberto leaves behind a widow and four children, two girls and two boys, the oldest is 17 and the youngest is 8.
Our companero did not have any enemies. This is proven by the facts of his life and his involvement in various organisations and institutions, with which he coordinated projects of community development. We know that behind his murder was a well orchestrated plan hatched by logging companies, who he was facing while defending the rights of the communities from unsustainable exploitation of forest resources in this area.
Days before his murder, he had put his demand that logging be stopped in this area to the National Institute of Conservation and Forestry Development (Instituto Nacional de Conservación y Desarrollo Forestal, ICF). In addition, he organised an open council in which resolved to take steps towards declaring the area a protected forest area. Given the importance of the forest for the Municipality, these actions certainly inconvenienced the exploiters of this resource, who saw their interests threatened and paid contract killer to put an end to Adalberto’s life. It also has to be mentioned that since the coup d'etat, logging operations have intensified. The loggers are taking advantage of the fact that they have friends in the ICF and other public institutions and are ignoring the rights of the communities.
Hence Adalberto and the communities were forced to defend their rights. What can we expect from a blind justice system that punishes the weak and protects the powerful? We call on national and international human rights organisations and organisations of the national front of resistance against the coup d'etat, that they denounce these facts, and we demand a thorough investigation so that the perpetrators will be punished.
Monday, May 17, 2010
Cuba in Haiti: Selective commendation, selective indignation
Emily J. Kirk, John M. Kirk and Norman Girvan
Cuba’s offer to rebuild Haiti’s entire national health service is arguably the most ambitious and impressive pledge made at the UN’s recent donor conference, write Emily J. Kirk, John M. Kirk and Norman Girvan, so why then have its efforts been largely ignored by the media, while those of other governments have been praised?
The January 2010 earthquake in Haiti caused some 230,000 deaths, left 1.5 million homeless, and has directly affected 3 million Haitians – a third of the population. On 31 March, representatives of over 50 governments and international organisations gathered at the United Nations Haiti Donor Conference to pledge long-term assistance for the rebuilding of Haiti. At the conference, Cuba made arguably the most ambitious and impressive pledge of all countries to rebuild the entire National Health Service. While the efforts of other governments have been praised, those of Cuba, however, have largely been ignored in the media.
The aim of Cuba’s contribution is to completely reconstruct the Haitian health care system – and to do so in a sustainable manner. The new system will be based on the Cuban model, embracing primary, secondary and tertiary health care, in addition to the training of additional Haitian doctors in Cuba. In summary[1]:
The primary level will include 101 clinics to treat annually an estimated 2.8 million patients, perform 1.3 million emergency operations, deliver 168,000 babies, and provide 3 million vaccinations.
The secondary level will be provided through 30 community hospitals. They will have the capacity to treat annually 2.1 million patients, and provide 1 million emergency surgeries, 54,000 operations, 276,000 electro-cardiograms, 107,000 dental exams, 144,000 diagnostic ultrasounds, and 487,000 laboratory tests. In addition, due to the high numbers of poly-traumatised patients, the 30 rehabilitation rooms will be included throughout the country and will provide 2.4 million therapeutic treatments for some 520,000 patients.
The tertiary level of health care will be delivered by the Haitian Specialties Hospital, staffed by 80 Cuban specialists. It will contain various clinical departments, and will be used for research and teaching, as well as the further training of Haitian professionals who will gradually replace the Cuban professionals.
Finally, 312 additional medical scholarships are to be provided for Haitian students to study in Cuba.
What is also significant point is that these are not just ‘pledges’ from Cuba, but rather a development of medical assistance, which has been provided over the last eleven years, and dramatically increased since the earthquake. A Cuban medical brigade has been in Haiti since 1999 and has ‘a presence in 127 of the 137 Haitian communes, saved 223,442 lives, treated 14 million people, performed 225,000 operations and delivered 109,000 babies’[2]. Furthermore much of the promised programme is already in place, as ‘post-quake, 23 of these primary care health centres, 15 community reference hospitals and 21 rehabilitation rooms are up and running’.
The cost of the Cuban programme over a ten-year period is estimated at $690.5 million – using 50 percent of international prices for services of this kind.[3] This is an enormous amount for a small developing country (11.2 million population); and moreover one that has been under a crippling economic blockade from its powerful neighbour for nearly half a century. It is even more notable when compared to those of other governments, particularly those of industrialised countries. For example, Cuba’s contribution in relation to its GDP is 152 times that of the United States, which pledged US$1.15 billion.[4] Among other G7 countries, France, the former colonial power, pledged US$188.93 million, Germany US$53.17 million, Japan US$75 million, and Canada US$375.23 million, while Italy and the United Kingdom, though not specifically listed, were probably included in the US$203.19 million pledge that was made in the name of ‘EU Remaining’ group of countries.[5]
Hence in absolute terms the monetary value of Cuba’s contribution is almost four times that of France, 12 times that of Germany, and almost twice that of Canada. Indeed, excluding the US, Cuba’s contribution is more than the rest of the G7 countries combined, as well as 35 per cent more than the contribution of the World Bank (US$479 million). In all, 59 pledges were made from governments, regional blocs and financial institutions.
In other words, while other countries are pledging money, Cuba is actively creating an entire sustainable health care system which will treat 75 per cent of the Haitian population,[6] and save hundreds of thousands of lives.
And yet, in spite of the extraordinary value of this commitment, it has been largely ignored by the principal North American media. An analysis of coverage of the Haiti Donor Conference by five major US media – CNN, the New York Times, the Boston Globe, the Washington Post, and the Miami Herald – revealed that, of 38 posts recorded in the ten days immediately following the conference, only one mentioned the Cuban contribution – and that only briefly. In fact the first four listed above entirely ignored Cuba’s contribution; the one mention being in the Miami Herald. On the other hand 22 of the 38 postings mention the US contribution. The amount of media coverage is also instructive in indicating the gradual decline in media interest following the disaster. That said, the UN Haiti Donor Conference was clearly worthy of widespread attention, with a major gathering of some of the world’s leading decision-makers – yet there was noticeably little published about it, and especially about Cuba’s extraordinary contribution.
In addition, our analysis of the first fifty results in Google News for ‘United Nations Haiti Donor Conference’ generated only two articles that mentioned Cuba’s role; one of which simply focused on the rarity of Cuban and United States officials working together. By contrast, 31 of the 50 articles discuss the contributions of developed countries at the donor conference, and 21 specifically discuss that of the United States – 9 of which mention the US$1.15 billion pledged by the US government.
Indeed a content analysis of the articles reveals that their main theme was the importance of the role of the United States in helping Haiti. The dollar amount pledged was repeatedly stated, and the US effort was often described as being equally (or more) important than that of the UN. According to one article, ‘The biggest contributions came from the United States and the European Union’.[7] Even if one compares the absolute amounts pledged, this is simply not true – as the Venezuelan pledge was for US$2.4 billion.[8] Another article singles out the United States, explaining ‘Over 140 nations, including the United States, have provided immediate assistance and relief to millions of Haitians’,[9] and in media coverage the United States consistently headed the list of contributing countries. Another article lists the United States as having a more important role than the United Nations, noting ‘Haiti's friends, as they are called – including the US, France, Brazil, Canada, the UN and the Red Cross’.[10] In sum, while relief efforts in Haiti were/are an international affair, the media have largely focused on contributions made by the United States.
Another common theme in coverage was the lack of assistance from other countries. Hence, when the assistance of the United States was not praised, those of other countries were denigrated. As one article states, ‘The United States pledged US$1.15 billion, in addition to the US$900 million it has already given... By comparison, China pledged US$1.5 million yes, you read it right, million with an “m” – in addition to the nearly US$14 million it has already given”.[11] Thus, there is a consistent pattern of disproportionately positive representation by the media of the role of the United States, one that both emphasises the actual pledge and ignores blatantly the significant Cuban pledge.
There is a dramatic contrast between the cover-up of Cuba’s extraordinary contribution to Haiti by mainstream US media and the enormous attention by the same media on alleged human rights abuses in that country. Literally dozens of articles on this topic have appeared in recent weeks. Of particular media interest was the death of Orlando Zapata Tamayo (a jailed ‘dissident’ with a criminal record who refused food for 80 days before dying) and the hunger strike of Guillermo Fariñas. The death of Zapata as a result of the hunger strike continues to be written about and discussed. Indeed it has been used consistently as a springboard to increase criticism of the Cuban government. Thus, between 10 February and 6 April, we found a total of 77 stories in the five media houses surveyed about the hunger strikers – five in CNN, seven in the New York Times, 13 in the Washington Post, four in the Boston Globe and 48 in the Miami Herald. The difference in the coverage of these two Cuba-related stories is striking. It reveals a clear disinterest in providing positive information on Cuba, but a significant appetite to criticise Cuba.
As a result, instead of reporting on an enormously important and topical story on a programme aimed at improving the lives of 75 per cent of Haiti’s population, the media have chosen to focus on the individual cases of two men who have consciously and deliberately decided to embark on a suicidal course. It does not take much to work out that the aim is to embarrass the Cuban government by following these ‘human interest’ stories about two individuals who oppose the Cuban government, presenting them as martyrs. It is also obvious that there is a clear media filter, one which seeks to prevent any media coverage that could be construed as being positive of Cuba – in this case seen in the government’s commitment to the reconstruction of Haiti.
In examining the media’s representation of Cuba’s role in Haiti’s development and the stories of two ‘dissidents’, it is clear that politically biased ‘infotainment’ has won out. Sadly (but perhaps predictably), in their coverage of Cuba, the media in the ‘developed world’ have focused on the latter while ignoring Cuba’s remarkable offer that will surely and significantly improve the lives of millions of Haitians, (while at the same time highlighting the role and contribution of the United States). Yet again we have an example of selective commendation and selective indignation in the North American media’s presentation of Cuba.
* Emily J. Kirk will be an MA student in Latin American Studies at Cambridge University in September.
* John Kirk is a professor of Latin American Studies at Dalhousie University, Canada. Both are working on a project on Cuban medical internationalism sponsored by Canada's Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC).
* Norman Girvan is professorial research fellow at the Institute of International Relations at the University of the West Indies in St Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago.
* This article first appeared in CounterPunch.
NOTES
[1] Details from the Statement by Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez to the Haiti Donor Conference, available at ‘Pledge Statements”; United Nations International Donors’ Conference Towards A New Future For Haiti’. 2010.
[2] From the Pledge Statement by Foreign Minister Rodriguez.
[3] The total ‘includes the medical services provided, calculated at 50% of international prices; the sustainability of these services and the personnel providing them; and the training of a further 312 Haitian doctors in Cuba’. Whereas the Official Text of the Cuban Statement published on the UN website refers to this cost ‘over four years’, the text of Foreign Minister’s Bruno Rodriguez’s speech as published by Granma International refers to this cost over ten years (see Overseas Territories Review)
[4] Cuba’s contribution of US$690.6 million is the equivalent of 1.22 percent of its annual GDP (US$56.52 billion in 2009); the US pledge of US$1.15 billion is the equivalent of 0.008096 percent of its annual GDP (US$14,204 billion in 2008). Source of the Cuban GDP estimate is the CIA Fact book figure at official rates of exchange; that of the US is the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
Cuba’s offer to rebuild Haiti’s entire national health service is arguably the most ambitious and impressive pledge made at the UN’s recent donor conference, write Emily J. Kirk, John M. Kirk and Norman Girvan, so why then have its efforts been largely ignored by the media, while those of other governments have been praised?
The January 2010 earthquake in Haiti caused some 230,000 deaths, left 1.5 million homeless, and has directly affected 3 million Haitians – a third of the population. On 31 March, representatives of over 50 governments and international organisations gathered at the United Nations Haiti Donor Conference to pledge long-term assistance for the rebuilding of Haiti. At the conference, Cuba made arguably the most ambitious and impressive pledge of all countries to rebuild the entire National Health Service. While the efforts of other governments have been praised, those of Cuba, however, have largely been ignored in the media.
The aim of Cuba’s contribution is to completely reconstruct the Haitian health care system – and to do so in a sustainable manner. The new system will be based on the Cuban model, embracing primary, secondary and tertiary health care, in addition to the training of additional Haitian doctors in Cuba. In summary[1]:
The primary level will include 101 clinics to treat annually an estimated 2.8 million patients, perform 1.3 million emergency operations, deliver 168,000 babies, and provide 3 million vaccinations.
The secondary level will be provided through 30 community hospitals. They will have the capacity to treat annually 2.1 million patients, and provide 1 million emergency surgeries, 54,000 operations, 276,000 electro-cardiograms, 107,000 dental exams, 144,000 diagnostic ultrasounds, and 487,000 laboratory tests. In addition, due to the high numbers of poly-traumatised patients, the 30 rehabilitation rooms will be included throughout the country and will provide 2.4 million therapeutic treatments for some 520,000 patients.
The tertiary level of health care will be delivered by the Haitian Specialties Hospital, staffed by 80 Cuban specialists. It will contain various clinical departments, and will be used for research and teaching, as well as the further training of Haitian professionals who will gradually replace the Cuban professionals.
Finally, 312 additional medical scholarships are to be provided for Haitian students to study in Cuba.
What is also significant point is that these are not just ‘pledges’ from Cuba, but rather a development of medical assistance, which has been provided over the last eleven years, and dramatically increased since the earthquake. A Cuban medical brigade has been in Haiti since 1999 and has ‘a presence in 127 of the 137 Haitian communes, saved 223,442 lives, treated 14 million people, performed 225,000 operations and delivered 109,000 babies’[2]. Furthermore much of the promised programme is already in place, as ‘post-quake, 23 of these primary care health centres, 15 community reference hospitals and 21 rehabilitation rooms are up and running’.
The cost of the Cuban programme over a ten-year period is estimated at $690.5 million – using 50 percent of international prices for services of this kind.[3] This is an enormous amount for a small developing country (11.2 million population); and moreover one that has been under a crippling economic blockade from its powerful neighbour for nearly half a century. It is even more notable when compared to those of other governments, particularly those of industrialised countries. For example, Cuba’s contribution in relation to its GDP is 152 times that of the United States, which pledged US$1.15 billion.[4] Among other G7 countries, France, the former colonial power, pledged US$188.93 million, Germany US$53.17 million, Japan US$75 million, and Canada US$375.23 million, while Italy and the United Kingdom, though not specifically listed, were probably included in the US$203.19 million pledge that was made in the name of ‘EU Remaining’ group of countries.[5]
Hence in absolute terms the monetary value of Cuba’s contribution is almost four times that of France, 12 times that of Germany, and almost twice that of Canada. Indeed, excluding the US, Cuba’s contribution is more than the rest of the G7 countries combined, as well as 35 per cent more than the contribution of the World Bank (US$479 million). In all, 59 pledges were made from governments, regional blocs and financial institutions.
In other words, while other countries are pledging money, Cuba is actively creating an entire sustainable health care system which will treat 75 per cent of the Haitian population,[6] and save hundreds of thousands of lives.
And yet, in spite of the extraordinary value of this commitment, it has been largely ignored by the principal North American media. An analysis of coverage of the Haiti Donor Conference by five major US media – CNN, the New York Times, the Boston Globe, the Washington Post, and the Miami Herald – revealed that, of 38 posts recorded in the ten days immediately following the conference, only one mentioned the Cuban contribution – and that only briefly. In fact the first four listed above entirely ignored Cuba’s contribution; the one mention being in the Miami Herald. On the other hand 22 of the 38 postings mention the US contribution. The amount of media coverage is also instructive in indicating the gradual decline in media interest following the disaster. That said, the UN Haiti Donor Conference was clearly worthy of widespread attention, with a major gathering of some of the world’s leading decision-makers – yet there was noticeably little published about it, and especially about Cuba’s extraordinary contribution.
In addition, our analysis of the first fifty results in Google News for ‘United Nations Haiti Donor Conference’ generated only two articles that mentioned Cuba’s role; one of which simply focused on the rarity of Cuban and United States officials working together. By contrast, 31 of the 50 articles discuss the contributions of developed countries at the donor conference, and 21 specifically discuss that of the United States – 9 of which mention the US$1.15 billion pledged by the US government.
Indeed a content analysis of the articles reveals that their main theme was the importance of the role of the United States in helping Haiti. The dollar amount pledged was repeatedly stated, and the US effort was often described as being equally (or more) important than that of the UN. According to one article, ‘The biggest contributions came from the United States and the European Union’.[7] Even if one compares the absolute amounts pledged, this is simply not true – as the Venezuelan pledge was for US$2.4 billion.[8] Another article singles out the United States, explaining ‘Over 140 nations, including the United States, have provided immediate assistance and relief to millions of Haitians’,[9] and in media coverage the United States consistently headed the list of contributing countries. Another article lists the United States as having a more important role than the United Nations, noting ‘Haiti's friends, as they are called – including the US, France, Brazil, Canada, the UN and the Red Cross’.[10] In sum, while relief efforts in Haiti were/are an international affair, the media have largely focused on contributions made by the United States.
Another common theme in coverage was the lack of assistance from other countries. Hence, when the assistance of the United States was not praised, those of other countries were denigrated. As one article states, ‘The United States pledged US$1.15 billion, in addition to the US$900 million it has already given... By comparison, China pledged US$1.5 million yes, you read it right, million with an “m” – in addition to the nearly US$14 million it has already given”.[11] Thus, there is a consistent pattern of disproportionately positive representation by the media of the role of the United States, one that both emphasises the actual pledge and ignores blatantly the significant Cuban pledge.
There is a dramatic contrast between the cover-up of Cuba’s extraordinary contribution to Haiti by mainstream US media and the enormous attention by the same media on alleged human rights abuses in that country. Literally dozens of articles on this topic have appeared in recent weeks. Of particular media interest was the death of Orlando Zapata Tamayo (a jailed ‘dissident’ with a criminal record who refused food for 80 days before dying) and the hunger strike of Guillermo Fariñas. The death of Zapata as a result of the hunger strike continues to be written about and discussed. Indeed it has been used consistently as a springboard to increase criticism of the Cuban government. Thus, between 10 February and 6 April, we found a total of 77 stories in the five media houses surveyed about the hunger strikers – five in CNN, seven in the New York Times, 13 in the Washington Post, four in the Boston Globe and 48 in the Miami Herald. The difference in the coverage of these two Cuba-related stories is striking. It reveals a clear disinterest in providing positive information on Cuba, but a significant appetite to criticise Cuba.
As a result, instead of reporting on an enormously important and topical story on a programme aimed at improving the lives of 75 per cent of Haiti’s population, the media have chosen to focus on the individual cases of two men who have consciously and deliberately decided to embark on a suicidal course. It does not take much to work out that the aim is to embarrass the Cuban government by following these ‘human interest’ stories about two individuals who oppose the Cuban government, presenting them as martyrs. It is also obvious that there is a clear media filter, one which seeks to prevent any media coverage that could be construed as being positive of Cuba – in this case seen in the government’s commitment to the reconstruction of Haiti.
In examining the media’s representation of Cuba’s role in Haiti’s development and the stories of two ‘dissidents’, it is clear that politically biased ‘infotainment’ has won out. Sadly (but perhaps predictably), in their coverage of Cuba, the media in the ‘developed world’ have focused on the latter while ignoring Cuba’s remarkable offer that will surely and significantly improve the lives of millions of Haitians, (while at the same time highlighting the role and contribution of the United States). Yet again we have an example of selective commendation and selective indignation in the North American media’s presentation of Cuba.
* Emily J. Kirk will be an MA student in Latin American Studies at Cambridge University in September.
* John Kirk is a professor of Latin American Studies at Dalhousie University, Canada. Both are working on a project on Cuban medical internationalism sponsored by Canada's Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC).
* Norman Girvan is professorial research fellow at the Institute of International Relations at the University of the West Indies in St Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago.
* This article first appeared in CounterPunch.
NOTES
[1] Details from the Statement by Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez to the Haiti Donor Conference, available at ‘Pledge Statements”; United Nations International Donors’ Conference Towards A New Future For Haiti’. 2010.
[2] From the Pledge Statement by Foreign Minister Rodriguez.
[3] The total ‘includes the medical services provided, calculated at 50% of international prices; the sustainability of these services and the personnel providing them; and the training of a further 312 Haitian doctors in Cuba’. Whereas the Official Text of the Cuban Statement published on the UN website refers to this cost ‘over four years’, the text of Foreign Minister’s Bruno Rodriguez’s speech as published by Granma International refers to this cost over ten years (see Overseas Territories Review)
[4] Cuba’s contribution of US$690.6 million is the equivalent of 1.22 percent of its annual GDP (US$56.52 billion in 2009); the US pledge of US$1.15 billion is the equivalent of 0.008096 percent of its annual GDP (US$14,204 billion in 2008). Source of the Cuban GDP estimate is the CIA Fact book figure at official rates of exchange; that of the US is the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
Saturday, May 8, 2010
Venezuela is not Greece
By Mark Weisbrot
Given the Venezuelan government's low public and foreign debt, the idea the country is facing an 'economic crisis' is plain wrong
With Venezuela's economy having contracted last year (as did the vast majority of economies in the Western Hemisphere), the economy suffering from electricity shortages, and the value of domestic currency having recently fallen sharply in the parallel market, stories of Venezuela's economic ruin are again making headlines.
The Washington Post, in a news article that reads more like an editorial, reports that Venezuela is "gripped by an economic crisis," and that "years of state interventions in the economy are taking a brutal toll on private business."
There is one important fact that is almost never mentioned in news articles about Venezuela, because it does not fit in with the narrative of a country that has spent wildly throughout the boom years, and will soon, like Greece, face its day of reckoning. That is the government's debt level: currently about 20% of GDP. In other words, even as it was tripling real social spending per person, increasing access to healthcare and education, and loaning or giving billions of dollars to other Latin American countries, Venezuela was reducing its debt burden during the oil price run-up. Venezuela's public debt fell from 47.5% of GDP in 2003 to 13.8% in 2008. In 2009, as the economy shrank, public debt picked up to 19.9% of GDP. Even if we include the debt of the state oil company, PDVSA, Venezuela's public debt is 26% of GDP. The foreign part of this debt is less than half of the total.
Compare this to Greece, where public debt is 115% of GDP and currently projected to rise to 149% in 2013. (The European Union average is about 79%.)
Given the Venezuelan government's very low public and foreign debt, the idea the country is facing an "economic crisis" is simply wrong. With oil at about $80 a barrel, Venezuela is running a sizeable current account surplus, and has a healthy level of reserves. Furthermore, the government can borrow internationally as necessary – last month China agreed to loan Venezuela $20bn in an advance payment for future oil deliveries.
Nonetheless, the country still faces significant economic challenges, some of which have been worsened by mistaken macroeconomic policy choices. The economy shrank by 3.3% last year. The international press has trouble understanding this, but the problem was that the government's fiscal policy was too conservative – cutting spending as the economy slipped into recession. This was a mistake, but hopefully the government will reverse this quickly with its planned expansion of public investment this year, including $6bn for electricity generation.
The government's biggest long-term economic mistake has been the maintenance of a fixed, overvalued exchange rate. Although the government devalued the currency in January, from 2.15 to 4.3 to the dollar for most official foreign exchange transactions, the currency is still overvalued. The parallel or black market rate is at more than seven to the dollar.
An overvalued currency – by making imports artificially cheap and the country's exports more expensive – hurts Venezuela's non-oil tradable goods' sectors and prevents the economy from diversifying away from oil. Worse still, the country's high inflation rate (28% over the last year, and averaging 21% annually over the last seven years) makes the currency more overvalued in real terms each year. (The press has misunderstood this problem, too – the inflation itself is too high, but the main damage it does to the economy is not from the price increases themselves but from causing an increasing overvaluation of the real exchange rate.)
But Venezuela is not in the situation of Greece – or even Portugal, Ireland, or Spain. Or Latvia or Estonia. The first four countries are stuck with an overvalued currency – for them, the euro – and implementing pro-cyclical fiscal policies (eg deficit reduction) that are deepening their recessions and/or slowing their recovery. They do not have any control over monetary policy, which rests with the European Central Bank. The latter two countries are in a similar situation for as long as they keep their currencies pegged to the euro, and have lost output six to eight times that of Venezuela over the last two years.
By contrast, Venezuela controls its own foreign exchange, monetary, and fiscal policies. It can use expansionary fiscal and monetary policy to stimulate the economy, and also exchange rate policy – by letting the currency float. A managed, or "dirty" float – in which the government does not set a target exchange rate but intervenes when necessary to preserve exchange rate stability – would suit the Venezuelan economy much better than the current fixed rate. The government could manage the exchange rate at a competitive level, and not have to waste so many dollars, as it does currently, trying to narrow the gap between the parallel and the official rate. Although there were (as usual, exaggerated) predictions that inflation would skyrocket with the most recent devaluation, it did not – possibly because most foreign exchange transactions take place through the parallel market anyway.
Venezuela is well situated to resolve its current macroeconomic problems and pursue a robust economic expansion, as it had from 2003-2008. The country is not facing a crisis, but rather a policy choice.
Given the Venezuelan government's low public and foreign debt, the idea the country is facing an 'economic crisis' is plain wrong
With Venezuela's economy having contracted last year (as did the vast majority of economies in the Western Hemisphere), the economy suffering from electricity shortages, and the value of domestic currency having recently fallen sharply in the parallel market, stories of Venezuela's economic ruin are again making headlines.
The Washington Post, in a news article that reads more like an editorial, reports that Venezuela is "gripped by an economic crisis," and that "years of state interventions in the economy are taking a brutal toll on private business."
There is one important fact that is almost never mentioned in news articles about Venezuela, because it does not fit in with the narrative of a country that has spent wildly throughout the boom years, and will soon, like Greece, face its day of reckoning. That is the government's debt level: currently about 20% of GDP. In other words, even as it was tripling real social spending per person, increasing access to healthcare and education, and loaning or giving billions of dollars to other Latin American countries, Venezuela was reducing its debt burden during the oil price run-up. Venezuela's public debt fell from 47.5% of GDP in 2003 to 13.8% in 2008. In 2009, as the economy shrank, public debt picked up to 19.9% of GDP. Even if we include the debt of the state oil company, PDVSA, Venezuela's public debt is 26% of GDP. The foreign part of this debt is less than half of the total.
Compare this to Greece, where public debt is 115% of GDP and currently projected to rise to 149% in 2013. (The European Union average is about 79%.)
Given the Venezuelan government's very low public and foreign debt, the idea the country is facing an "economic crisis" is simply wrong. With oil at about $80 a barrel, Venezuela is running a sizeable current account surplus, and has a healthy level of reserves. Furthermore, the government can borrow internationally as necessary – last month China agreed to loan Venezuela $20bn in an advance payment for future oil deliveries.
Nonetheless, the country still faces significant economic challenges, some of which have been worsened by mistaken macroeconomic policy choices. The economy shrank by 3.3% last year. The international press has trouble understanding this, but the problem was that the government's fiscal policy was too conservative – cutting spending as the economy slipped into recession. This was a mistake, but hopefully the government will reverse this quickly with its planned expansion of public investment this year, including $6bn for electricity generation.
The government's biggest long-term economic mistake has been the maintenance of a fixed, overvalued exchange rate. Although the government devalued the currency in January, from 2.15 to 4.3 to the dollar for most official foreign exchange transactions, the currency is still overvalued. The parallel or black market rate is at more than seven to the dollar.
An overvalued currency – by making imports artificially cheap and the country's exports more expensive – hurts Venezuela's non-oil tradable goods' sectors and prevents the economy from diversifying away from oil. Worse still, the country's high inflation rate (28% over the last year, and averaging 21% annually over the last seven years) makes the currency more overvalued in real terms each year. (The press has misunderstood this problem, too – the inflation itself is too high, but the main damage it does to the economy is not from the price increases themselves but from causing an increasing overvaluation of the real exchange rate.)
But Venezuela is not in the situation of Greece – or even Portugal, Ireland, or Spain. Or Latvia or Estonia. The first four countries are stuck with an overvalued currency – for them, the euro – and implementing pro-cyclical fiscal policies (eg deficit reduction) that are deepening their recessions and/or slowing their recovery. They do not have any control over monetary policy, which rests with the European Central Bank. The latter two countries are in a similar situation for as long as they keep their currencies pegged to the euro, and have lost output six to eight times that of Venezuela over the last two years.
By contrast, Venezuela controls its own foreign exchange, monetary, and fiscal policies. It can use expansionary fiscal and monetary policy to stimulate the economy, and also exchange rate policy – by letting the currency float. A managed, or "dirty" float – in which the government does not set a target exchange rate but intervenes when necessary to preserve exchange rate stability – would suit the Venezuelan economy much better than the current fixed rate. The government could manage the exchange rate at a competitive level, and not have to waste so many dollars, as it does currently, trying to narrow the gap between the parallel and the official rate. Although there were (as usual, exaggerated) predictions that inflation would skyrocket with the most recent devaluation, it did not – possibly because most foreign exchange transactions take place through the parallel market anyway.
Venezuela is well situated to resolve its current macroeconomic problems and pursue a robust economic expansion, as it had from 2003-2008. The country is not facing a crisis, but rather a policy choice.
UN: Forced displacement in Colombia increases by 150,000 each year
By KIRSTEN BEGG
Forced displacement of Colombian citizens increases by 150,000 people a year, Ariranga Govindasamy Pillay, one of 18 experts from the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) said at a Geneva conference Tuesday.
"94% of the displaced live below the poverty line and only 20% of the land stripped from them has been investigated. What about the other 80%? There seems to be impunity for the perpertrators," said Pillay.
"We have a huge amount of internally displaced people, there are 3.3 million, which is about 7% of the population," said Colombia's Director of National Planning Esteban Piedrahita.
"We have confiscated 2 million hectares of land that criminal groups acquired illegally and now it's up to the justice system to decide to return it to its rightful owners," Piedrahita said.
Pillay also denounced the murder of eight displaced Colombians in the first two months of 2010.
"Half of those displaced in Colombia are women and there is no government policy for the protection of women's economic, social and cultural rights, particularly in respect to health, housing, working, education and food," said Maria Eugenia Ramirez, a representative of Colombian NGO CLADE in Geneva.
The discussion over Colombia in Geneva will continue Wednesday and CESCR is expected to give its recommendation by May 21.
Displaced Colombians say they have been abandoned by the State and complain that there are "many inconsistencies in the humanitarian aid" provided.
Forced displacement of Colombian citizens increases by 150,000 people a year, Ariranga Govindasamy Pillay, one of 18 experts from the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) said at a Geneva conference Tuesday.
"94% of the displaced live below the poverty line and only 20% of the land stripped from them has been investigated. What about the other 80%? There seems to be impunity for the perpertrators," said Pillay.
"We have a huge amount of internally displaced people, there are 3.3 million, which is about 7% of the population," said Colombia's Director of National Planning Esteban Piedrahita.
"We have confiscated 2 million hectares of land that criminal groups acquired illegally and now it's up to the justice system to decide to return it to its rightful owners," Piedrahita said.
Pillay also denounced the murder of eight displaced Colombians in the first two months of 2010.
"Half of those displaced in Colombia are women and there is no government policy for the protection of women's economic, social and cultural rights, particularly in respect to health, housing, working, education and food," said Maria Eugenia Ramirez, a representative of Colombian NGO CLADE in Geneva.
The discussion over Colombia in Geneva will continue Wednesday and CESCR is expected to give its recommendation by May 21.
Displaced Colombians say they have been abandoned by the State and complain that there are "many inconsistencies in the humanitarian aid" provided.
18,200 Colombians went missing in 2009
By BRETT BORKAN
Over 18,200 Colombians went missing during 2009, up from almost 15,700 in 2008, according to an annual report issued by Colombia's forensics agency, Medicina Legal, Radio Santa Fe reported Wednesday.
The amount of people who went missing in 2009, 18,236, is a 14% increase on the 15,696 missing in 2008, and far higher than the 4,323 who went missing in 2007.
According to Medicina Legal's director, Janeth Forero, the victims of disappearances are similar to the victims of other violent crimes in Colombia; "young people and men, in the majority of the cases."
The 2009 report highlighted that the Colombian department of Antioquia is the most affected region of the country, reporting 3,976 disappearances in 2009, compared to only 471 in 2008.
Violent crimes, including homicides and forced displacements have soared in 2009 in nearly every major city in Colombia.
Pressure Mounts on Honduras as Journalist Death Toll Rises
By Thelma Mejía
(IPS) - Honduran President Porfirio Lobo plans to seek help from police forces in Colombia and the United States to try to solve the murders of seven journalists committed in the space of less than two months, which will also be investigated by a delegation from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights next month.
Jorge Orellana, popularly known as "Georgino", was gunned down on Apr. 20, just a week after radio announcer Luis Chévez met a similar fate on Apr. 13.
Five fellow journalists -- Joseph Andoni Hernández Ochoa, David Meza, Nahum Palacios, José Bayardo Mairena and Manuel Juárez -- were shot and killed in March.
Five of the seven slain reporters worked outside the capital. Bayardo Mairena and Suárez were shot and killed in the northeastern province of Olancho while investigating a drug trafficking ring, according to unofficial reports, although the police have yet to comment on the possible motives behind their murders.
All of the journalists were killed in drive-by shootings by unknown gunmen riding on motorbikes, who fired on each victim over a dozen times. According to the police and the Observatory on Violence, a joint initiative of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the public National Autonomous University of Honduras (UNAH), this is a modus operandi typical of hired killers.
Orellana worked for a television station in the northern Honduran city of San Pedro Sula, 250 kilometres north of Tegucigalpa, and also taught journalism classes at UNAH.
His murder has stepped up local and international pressure on Lobo, who returned to Honduras on Wednesday from a tour of the United States, where he visited universities and met with business leaders.
Lobo said Honduras would seek help from other countries with greater experience in criminal investigation to identify the killers of the seven journalists. He highlighted the work in this area of the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) in the United States.
Colombia, the other country where Lobo plans to request assistance, has been one of the world’s most dangerous countries for journalists for decades, and is currently engulfed in a scandal over a state-run intelligence apparatus set up to spy on and sabotage government opponents, activists and journalists.
A delegation from the Washington-based Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) will arrive in Honduras in the second week of May to investigate the killings.
The delegation will also look into reports of harassment and intimidation made by members of the National Popular Resistance Front, which headed up the protests against the Jun. 28, 2009 overthrow of former president Manuel Zelaya.
Added to these incidents are the death threats received by Father Ismael Moreno, a Jesuit priest, activist and radio station director, for his protection of a young woman reportedly raped by police in August 2009 in the midst of demonstrations against the coup.
Moreno, the director of Radio Progreso (based in the city of the same name) and an outspoken opponent of the coup, was spirited out of the country last weekend, his Jesuit colleagues informed IPS. The Jesuit community in Honduras works primarily in the northern part of the country.
Deputy Attorney General Ricardo Rodríguez told IPS that all of these incidents are being investigated, and that his office is working with other government agencies on a response to the latest annual report from the IACHR, which placed Honduras for the first time ever on the list of countries where the human rights situation "warranted special attention" in 2009, alongside Colombia, Cuba, Haiti and Venezuela.
The report details the human rights abuses committed in the aftermath of Zelaya's ouster, including the climate of threats and intimidation faced by the country’s journalists.
"We have a month to respond to the report, but if this mission comes in May to investigate the killings of the journalists, that's even better -- we will cooperate and we will not hide anything," said Rodríguez.
Minister of Security Óscar Álvarez stated this week that the journalists’ murders were not connected to their professional activity, but he did not offer any other possible motives.
Speaking with IPS, Álvarez reiterated this claim and urged journalists to "be cautious," given the high level of insecurity in the country, where an average of 14 people meet with a violent death every day. The majority of these murders are attributed to drug trafficking gangs.
Álvarez has been summoned to appear before Congress next week to report on the progress made so far in the investigations.
The minister’s claims have been challenged by the journalism community, however.
This week, major media outlets launched a campaign to pressure the government to clear up the murders, while reporters are collecting signatures through social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter for a petition condemning the continued impunity enjoyed by the killers and demanding transparency in the investigation of the murders.
Elán Reyes, president of the Journalists’ Association of Honduras, condemned the killings but also called for journalists to exercise caution and "self-regulation". His comments were harshly criticised as an implicit call for self-censorship, although he denied this interpretation.
Catalina Botero, Organisation of American States Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, stated on Apr. 20 in San Salvador that Honduras is in a state of "red alert" and described it as one of the most dangerous countries in the world to be a journalist today
(IPS) - Honduran President Porfirio Lobo plans to seek help from police forces in Colombia and the United States to try to solve the murders of seven journalists committed in the space of less than two months, which will also be investigated by a delegation from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights next month.
Jorge Orellana, popularly known as "Georgino", was gunned down on Apr. 20, just a week after radio announcer Luis Chévez met a similar fate on Apr. 13.
Five fellow journalists -- Joseph Andoni Hernández Ochoa, David Meza, Nahum Palacios, José Bayardo Mairena and Manuel Juárez -- were shot and killed in March.
Five of the seven slain reporters worked outside the capital. Bayardo Mairena and Suárez were shot and killed in the northeastern province of Olancho while investigating a drug trafficking ring, according to unofficial reports, although the police have yet to comment on the possible motives behind their murders.
All of the journalists were killed in drive-by shootings by unknown gunmen riding on motorbikes, who fired on each victim over a dozen times. According to the police and the Observatory on Violence, a joint initiative of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the public National Autonomous University of Honduras (UNAH), this is a modus operandi typical of hired killers.
Orellana worked for a television station in the northern Honduran city of San Pedro Sula, 250 kilometres north of Tegucigalpa, and also taught journalism classes at UNAH.
His murder has stepped up local and international pressure on Lobo, who returned to Honduras on Wednesday from a tour of the United States, where he visited universities and met with business leaders.
Lobo said Honduras would seek help from other countries with greater experience in criminal investigation to identify the killers of the seven journalists. He highlighted the work in this area of the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) in the United States.
Colombia, the other country where Lobo plans to request assistance, has been one of the world’s most dangerous countries for journalists for decades, and is currently engulfed in a scandal over a state-run intelligence apparatus set up to spy on and sabotage government opponents, activists and journalists.
A delegation from the Washington-based Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) will arrive in Honduras in the second week of May to investigate the killings.
The delegation will also look into reports of harassment and intimidation made by members of the National Popular Resistance Front, which headed up the protests against the Jun. 28, 2009 overthrow of former president Manuel Zelaya.
Added to these incidents are the death threats received by Father Ismael Moreno, a Jesuit priest, activist and radio station director, for his protection of a young woman reportedly raped by police in August 2009 in the midst of demonstrations against the coup.
Moreno, the director of Radio Progreso (based in the city of the same name) and an outspoken opponent of the coup, was spirited out of the country last weekend, his Jesuit colleagues informed IPS. The Jesuit community in Honduras works primarily in the northern part of the country.
Deputy Attorney General Ricardo Rodríguez told IPS that all of these incidents are being investigated, and that his office is working with other government agencies on a response to the latest annual report from the IACHR, which placed Honduras for the first time ever on the list of countries where the human rights situation "warranted special attention" in 2009, alongside Colombia, Cuba, Haiti and Venezuela.
The report details the human rights abuses committed in the aftermath of Zelaya's ouster, including the climate of threats and intimidation faced by the country’s journalists.
"We have a month to respond to the report, but if this mission comes in May to investigate the killings of the journalists, that's even better -- we will cooperate and we will not hide anything," said Rodríguez.
Minister of Security Óscar Álvarez stated this week that the journalists’ murders were not connected to their professional activity, but he did not offer any other possible motives.
Speaking with IPS, Álvarez reiterated this claim and urged journalists to "be cautious," given the high level of insecurity in the country, where an average of 14 people meet with a violent death every day. The majority of these murders are attributed to drug trafficking gangs.
Álvarez has been summoned to appear before Congress next week to report on the progress made so far in the investigations.
The minister’s claims have been challenged by the journalism community, however.
This week, major media outlets launched a campaign to pressure the government to clear up the murders, while reporters are collecting signatures through social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter for a petition condemning the continued impunity enjoyed by the killers and demanding transparency in the investigation of the murders.
Elán Reyes, president of the Journalists’ Association of Honduras, condemned the killings but also called for journalists to exercise caution and "self-regulation". His comments were harshly criticised as an implicit call for self-censorship, although he denied this interpretation.
Catalina Botero, Organisation of American States Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, stated on Apr. 20 in San Salvador that Honduras is in a state of "red alert" and described it as one of the most dangerous countries in the world to be a journalist today
Wednesday, May 5, 2010
Green is for Go in Colombia
by COHA Senior Research Fellow W. John Green Ph.D.
• COHA op-ed of the week
An extraordinary event may be reflected in Colombia’s electoral polling: conceivably the politics of thuggery, corruption and Bogotá-inspired violence under the ruling Uribe administration, is being successfully challenged by Mockus’ Green Party.
The amazing rise of Antanas Mockus and his Green Party in Colombia belies the stereotype, common even among Latin America specialists, of a country irredeemably plagued by violence and appropriately known for its “faux democracy.” Mockus and the Greens prove that Colombian democracy can be real enough, though admittedly conflicted. The sudden surge of Mockus is not completely surprising. It is, rather, a new chapter in an old struggle between two powerful political currents in Colombia’s societal evolution, where controversial movements of popular mobilization and democratic optimism have repeatedly had to face presidential administrations, now embodied in the Álvaro Uribe administration, one that is no stranger to violence and intimidation. What is at stake is not just how Uribe will go down in history, but whether the harsh realities of the Uribe presidency will allow the White House to reverse itself and back the pending U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (which it seems to want to do) that President Obama opposed while he was a member of the Senate.
Yet, this is something new. Mockus, a popular two-term former mayor of Bogotá, is a mathematician, philosopher, and former rector of the National University in Bogotá. The flamboyant and eccentric child of Lithuanian immigrants once mooned a student assembly to get their attention. As mayor, he donned tights and a cape as “Supercitizen,” and was married in a circus tent while riding an elephant. In war-torn Colombia, he, on the contrary, has pacifist tendencies.
Mockus teamed up with other former progressive mayors of Bogotá, Enrique Peñalosa and Luis Eduardo Garzón, who collectively joined the Greens to run in its presidential primary, with an agreement to support the victor. The Green Party’s rise was truly spectacular. Originally hoping to secure 500,000 votes in its primary, the Greens themselves were astounded when 1,822,856 Colombians voted. In the 3-way race for the party’s presidential candidate, the Greens chose Mockus. Columnist Daniel Coronell wrote in the respected Semana magazine that a Green/Mockus government “would not look like anything we’ve seen before.” José Fernando Isaza, rector of Jorge Tadeo Lozano University asserted that, unlike other recent governments (namely, that of current President Álvaro Uribe) a Mockus government would not persecute political opponents.
Elected in 2002 by a citizenry angry over kidnappings by the FARC, Colombia’s largest guerrilla army, and other security concerns, President Uribe slammed the door on almost twenty years of repeated attempts at peace negotiations that were invariably thwarted amidst the mass murder of leftist politicians and rightist hardliners, and those in between. Indeed, since the late 1940s, Colombia has endured recurrent cycles of reform and repression, in which attempts at political and economic change engendered violent backlashes, in the time-honored Colombian way of dealing with such pariah forces of the days. While the chances that Uribe’s aggressive approach would actually resolve Colombia’s 60-year-long political predicament have always been close to zero, it has nevertheless taken eight years for the current faith in hardliner strategy to fade.
After President Uribe was barred by an unexpectedly feisty Colombian Supreme Court from running for a third term, war hawk Juan Manuel Santos, his former Defense Minister, became his anointed heir. Santos is the stand-in for Uribe’s “Democratic Security” policy, consisting of a hard-line, no compromise nor negotiation approach toward the major guerrilla movements, the ELN and the FARC. The current policy amounts to placing the country on an eternal war footing. It cannot be gainsaid that this strategy is still very popular with a sizable percentage of Colombians, and until early April, Santos seemed to have a lock on victory; yet the various scandals and abuses of the Uribe years were rattling in the closet (especially the government and military connections to the paramilitary movement) and finally took their toll.
The presidential election now suddenly looks like a potential game changer, particularly after the Greens did surprisingly well in the March Congressional elections, winning 5 Senate seats. Soon thereafter, Mockus secured Sergio Fajardo, another popular former mayor (of Medellín, Colombia’s second largest city), as his vice presidential running mate. Fajardo is also a mathematician and former academic. Their somewhat vague program emphasizing anti-corruption and civic responsibility, turned out to be a surprise winner. It is pro-growth, and enjoys ample business support, with Mockus insisting that his government would not negotiate with the guerrillas as long as they continue to hold kidnapped hostages. He is clearly an “anti-politician” candidate, and he certainly shot up as the “anti-Uribe” standard bearer. In response to questions about bombing neighboring countries (as Uribe did in 2008 when he attacked FARC camps in Ecuador), Mockus insisted that he would respect the Colombian Constitution and international treaties. His supporters even turned his disclosure of early stage Parkinson’s disease into a strength when they joked that the real shaking is taking place in the Uribe camp, and is driven by fear. By early April, Mockus was surging into second place in polls ranking the various presidential candidates. These polls also pushed aside Conservative Party candidate Noemí Sanín. By the last week of the month, polls showed Mockus pulling ahead, and indicated that he would likely defeat Santos in a second round. Mockus has even claimed that he could possibly win a majority in the first round of voting on May 30th.
Naturally, Mockus’ critics stress fears over security. This approach began at the top of the executive branch in early April, when a caterwauling President Uribe faulted Mayor Mockus (who was in office when Uribe was elected) for deploying feeble security measures during Uribe’s 2002 inauguration, during which the FARC attempted a primitive mortar attack. Weeks later, Uribe referred to “lame horses” not being up to the job of protecting Colombians, in a not too subtle allusion to Mockus’ Parkinson’s illness. This line was seconded by an Uribe devotee and would-be, if witless, presidential candidate, former Agricultural Minister, Andrés Felipe Arias, who quipped that the FARC “won’t be defeated with mimes and sunflowers.” Sunflowers, of course, are the Green Party symbol, and as Mayor, Mockus used mimes to shame traffic violators into responsible driving.
Mockus, who repeatedly insists that he would not negotiate with guerrillas until they release their kidnapped hostages, and pledges that he will preserve the “advances in security” achieved under Uribe’s administrations, points out that Uribe might recall that the latter had earlier praised his security work as Mayor, and even decorated him for it (of which there is plenty of inconvenient video to preserve the point).
Forces of the progressive left believe that they are ready for a resurgence, even by a win. They have demonstrated that they comprehend the role of the new media, as in last year’s Obama campaign. Mockus and Fajardo are very popular on Facebook and Twitter, and can count on much of the urban and youth vote; they are making 10,000 new “friends” a day, rocketing from 200 a couple of months ago to 450,000 as of April 29. The Mockus wave represents a new hope for Latin American left of center politics, and, closer to home, a significant rejection of the Uribe years, as well as promises to break with the policies of the recent past. Still, this may not be an easy victory. Mockus must win support in the countryside and on the Atlantic coast, where decades of paramilitary cleansing of the population, as well as continued threats to left-leaning voters and candidates, will make that trial difficult to tread.
As its core, the Green message stresses the ageless theme of the redemption of morality in politics. This resonates with the most famous presidential campaign in Colombian history, that of the martyred Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, who championed social and “distributive” justice, and ran in 1946 for the “moral and democratic restoration of the republic.” Though he split the Liberal vote and lost the election, historians widely agree that Gaitán, if he had been spared, would have been elected president in 1950. Gaitán’s assassination in 1948 is generally viewed as one of the key detonators of the “Violencia” period that lasted until the mid 1960s, and in some ways, continues until today. Therefore, apprehensive Colombians are well aware that plucky candidates like Mockus have a tendency to get killed before they can be elected.
The victory of a united left and center under Mockus–now a strong possibility–is refreshing, exciting, and potentially terrifying, given the likelihood of violent reaction, as all of Colombia’s woeful traditional problems and dangers still remain.
One of this country’s most distinguished specialists on Colombia, Dr. Green is a Senior Research Fellow at the Washington-based Council on Hemispheric Affairs and the author of Gaitanismo, Left, Liberalism and Popular Mobilization in Colombia (Gainesville: University of Florida Press. 2003)
• COHA op-ed of the week
An extraordinary event may be reflected in Colombia’s electoral polling: conceivably the politics of thuggery, corruption and Bogotá-inspired violence under the ruling Uribe administration, is being successfully challenged by Mockus’ Green Party.
The amazing rise of Antanas Mockus and his Green Party in Colombia belies the stereotype, common even among Latin America specialists, of a country irredeemably plagued by violence and appropriately known for its “faux democracy.” Mockus and the Greens prove that Colombian democracy can be real enough, though admittedly conflicted. The sudden surge of Mockus is not completely surprising. It is, rather, a new chapter in an old struggle between two powerful political currents in Colombia’s societal evolution, where controversial movements of popular mobilization and democratic optimism have repeatedly had to face presidential administrations, now embodied in the Álvaro Uribe administration, one that is no stranger to violence and intimidation. What is at stake is not just how Uribe will go down in history, but whether the harsh realities of the Uribe presidency will allow the White House to reverse itself and back the pending U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (which it seems to want to do) that President Obama opposed while he was a member of the Senate.
Yet, this is something new. Mockus, a popular two-term former mayor of Bogotá, is a mathematician, philosopher, and former rector of the National University in Bogotá. The flamboyant and eccentric child of Lithuanian immigrants once mooned a student assembly to get their attention. As mayor, he donned tights and a cape as “Supercitizen,” and was married in a circus tent while riding an elephant. In war-torn Colombia, he, on the contrary, has pacifist tendencies.
Mockus teamed up with other former progressive mayors of Bogotá, Enrique Peñalosa and Luis Eduardo Garzón, who collectively joined the Greens to run in its presidential primary, with an agreement to support the victor. The Green Party’s rise was truly spectacular. Originally hoping to secure 500,000 votes in its primary, the Greens themselves were astounded when 1,822,856 Colombians voted. In the 3-way race for the party’s presidential candidate, the Greens chose Mockus. Columnist Daniel Coronell wrote in the respected Semana magazine that a Green/Mockus government “would not look like anything we’ve seen before.” José Fernando Isaza, rector of Jorge Tadeo Lozano University asserted that, unlike other recent governments (namely, that of current President Álvaro Uribe) a Mockus government would not persecute political opponents.
Elected in 2002 by a citizenry angry over kidnappings by the FARC, Colombia’s largest guerrilla army, and other security concerns, President Uribe slammed the door on almost twenty years of repeated attempts at peace negotiations that were invariably thwarted amidst the mass murder of leftist politicians and rightist hardliners, and those in between. Indeed, since the late 1940s, Colombia has endured recurrent cycles of reform and repression, in which attempts at political and economic change engendered violent backlashes, in the time-honored Colombian way of dealing with such pariah forces of the days. While the chances that Uribe’s aggressive approach would actually resolve Colombia’s 60-year-long political predicament have always been close to zero, it has nevertheless taken eight years for the current faith in hardliner strategy to fade.
After President Uribe was barred by an unexpectedly feisty Colombian Supreme Court from running for a third term, war hawk Juan Manuel Santos, his former Defense Minister, became his anointed heir. Santos is the stand-in for Uribe’s “Democratic Security” policy, consisting of a hard-line, no compromise nor negotiation approach toward the major guerrilla movements, the ELN and the FARC. The current policy amounts to placing the country on an eternal war footing. It cannot be gainsaid that this strategy is still very popular with a sizable percentage of Colombians, and until early April, Santos seemed to have a lock on victory; yet the various scandals and abuses of the Uribe years were rattling in the closet (especially the government and military connections to the paramilitary movement) and finally took their toll.
The presidential election now suddenly looks like a potential game changer, particularly after the Greens did surprisingly well in the March Congressional elections, winning 5 Senate seats. Soon thereafter, Mockus secured Sergio Fajardo, another popular former mayor (of Medellín, Colombia’s second largest city), as his vice presidential running mate. Fajardo is also a mathematician and former academic. Their somewhat vague program emphasizing anti-corruption and civic responsibility, turned out to be a surprise winner. It is pro-growth, and enjoys ample business support, with Mockus insisting that his government would not negotiate with the guerrillas as long as they continue to hold kidnapped hostages. He is clearly an “anti-politician” candidate, and he certainly shot up as the “anti-Uribe” standard bearer. In response to questions about bombing neighboring countries (as Uribe did in 2008 when he attacked FARC camps in Ecuador), Mockus insisted that he would respect the Colombian Constitution and international treaties. His supporters even turned his disclosure of early stage Parkinson’s disease into a strength when they joked that the real shaking is taking place in the Uribe camp, and is driven by fear. By early April, Mockus was surging into second place in polls ranking the various presidential candidates. These polls also pushed aside Conservative Party candidate Noemí Sanín. By the last week of the month, polls showed Mockus pulling ahead, and indicated that he would likely defeat Santos in a second round. Mockus has even claimed that he could possibly win a majority in the first round of voting on May 30th.
Naturally, Mockus’ critics stress fears over security. This approach began at the top of the executive branch in early April, when a caterwauling President Uribe faulted Mayor Mockus (who was in office when Uribe was elected) for deploying feeble security measures during Uribe’s 2002 inauguration, during which the FARC attempted a primitive mortar attack. Weeks later, Uribe referred to “lame horses” not being up to the job of protecting Colombians, in a not too subtle allusion to Mockus’ Parkinson’s illness. This line was seconded by an Uribe devotee and would-be, if witless, presidential candidate, former Agricultural Minister, Andrés Felipe Arias, who quipped that the FARC “won’t be defeated with mimes and sunflowers.” Sunflowers, of course, are the Green Party symbol, and as Mayor, Mockus used mimes to shame traffic violators into responsible driving.
Mockus, who repeatedly insists that he would not negotiate with guerrillas until they release their kidnapped hostages, and pledges that he will preserve the “advances in security” achieved under Uribe’s administrations, points out that Uribe might recall that the latter had earlier praised his security work as Mayor, and even decorated him for it (of which there is plenty of inconvenient video to preserve the point).
Forces of the progressive left believe that they are ready for a resurgence, even by a win. They have demonstrated that they comprehend the role of the new media, as in last year’s Obama campaign. Mockus and Fajardo are very popular on Facebook and Twitter, and can count on much of the urban and youth vote; they are making 10,000 new “friends” a day, rocketing from 200 a couple of months ago to 450,000 as of April 29. The Mockus wave represents a new hope for Latin American left of center politics, and, closer to home, a significant rejection of the Uribe years, as well as promises to break with the policies of the recent past. Still, this may not be an easy victory. Mockus must win support in the countryside and on the Atlantic coast, where decades of paramilitary cleansing of the population, as well as continued threats to left-leaning voters and candidates, will make that trial difficult to tread.
As its core, the Green message stresses the ageless theme of the redemption of morality in politics. This resonates with the most famous presidential campaign in Colombian history, that of the martyred Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, who championed social and “distributive” justice, and ran in 1946 for the “moral and democratic restoration of the republic.” Though he split the Liberal vote and lost the election, historians widely agree that Gaitán, if he had been spared, would have been elected president in 1950. Gaitán’s assassination in 1948 is generally viewed as one of the key detonators of the “Violencia” period that lasted until the mid 1960s, and in some ways, continues until today. Therefore, apprehensive Colombians are well aware that plucky candidates like Mockus have a tendency to get killed before they can be elected.
The victory of a united left and center under Mockus–now a strong possibility–is refreshing, exciting, and potentially terrifying, given the likelihood of violent reaction, as all of Colombia’s woeful traditional problems and dangers still remain.
One of this country’s most distinguished specialists on Colombia, Dr. Green is a Senior Research Fellow at the Washington-based Council on Hemispheric Affairs and the author of Gaitanismo, Left, Liberalism and Popular Mobilization in Colombia (Gainesville: University of Florida Press. 2003)
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