THE principal dictator of Argentina's "dirty war", Jorge Videla, has been sentenced to life in prison.
The conviction was Videla's first in 25 years for crimes against humanity. Relatives who packed the courtroom held up grainy black-and-white pictures of the victims and shouted "murderers". Most of the two-dozen former military and police officials tried with Videla, including retired general Luciano Benjamin Menendez, also received life sentences.
Videla, an 85-year-old former army general who ruled the military junta between 1976 and 1981, had acknowledged his actions, but denied they were human rights violations, insisting he was an unjustly convicted "political prisoner".
The judges found Videla "criminally responsible" for the deaths of prisoners who were transferred from civilian jail cells to a clandestine prison where they were repeatedly tortured and interrogated before being killed.
Videla told the court Argentine society had demanded the crackdown to prevent a Marxist revolution and complained that "terrorists" now ran the country.
Videla must serve his sentence in a civilian prison, the judges decided, ruling out the privileges he enjoyed after he was first convicted of crimes against humanity in 1985, as Argentina struggled to return to democracy. Videla served just five years of a life sentence in a military prison before former president Carlos Menem granted him and other junta leaders amnesty.
After a concerted campaign to reform a judicial system packed with dictatorship-era judges, the Supreme Court overturned those amnesties in 2007, and President Cristina Fernandez has encouraged a wave of new trials of former military and police figures involved in the clandestine torture centres, where thousands of the regime's opponents disappeared.
The sentencing judge, Maria Elba Martinez, described Videla as "a manifestation of state terrorism". Some of his co-defendants received lesser terms, and seven minor defendants whose cases were joined to Videla's were found not guilty.
The 31 victims in this case - many of them university students with links to armed leftist revolutionary movements - were taken to a centre in Cordoba and tortured, including by electric shock, rape, simulated asphyxiation with water and nylon bags, and mock executions. They were left naked in cold, wet cells throughout the winter, and were told their families would be killed if they did not confess, said survivors. Menendez told the court it was historically revisionist to present armed leftist groups as passive victims with no responsibility for criminal acts. The Montoneros, a Peronist urban guerilla group of the 1960s and 70s, and the People's Revolutionary Army were committing violent acts before the coup, he reminded the judge.
"They were combatants who took on certain risks," Menendez told the court. "It's not a crime against humanity to fight an armed combatant." Videla and Menendez claimed they had to act as they did in order to prevent what they considered would be a greater tragedy - the transformation of Argentina from a conservative Christian society to a Marxist state.
About 13,000 people were killed or disappeared during the dirty war, which ran from 1976 to 1983, according to a government count. Human rights groups put the figure at 30,000.
Thursday, December 23, 2010
Dissidents have little support in Cuba: WikiLeaks
By Jeff Franks
(Reuters) - Despite years of U.S. political and financial support for Cuban dissidents, the top U.S. diplomat in Havana said opposition leaders are largely unknown, badly divided and unlikely to ever run the country, according to a secret diplomatic cable obtained by WikiLeaks.
U.S. Interests Section chief Jonathan Farrar said the dissidents deserved backing as the "conscience of Cuba," but Washington "should look elsewhere, including within the government itself, to spot likely successors to the Castro regime."
"We see very little evidence that the mainline dissident organizations have much resonance among ordinary Cubans," Farrar said. Without changes, he said, "the traditional dissident movement is not likely to supplant the Cuban government."
The cable, published on Thursday by Spanish newspaper El Pais, is one of 250,000 confidential U.S. diplomatic cables Wikileaks has begun issuing on the Internet and provided to a number of media outlets.
Farrar's comments, made in a cable dated April 15, 2009, raise questions about the wisdom of the United States' longtime policy of supporting Cuban dissidents as an alternative to the Communist government that has ruled the island since a 1959 revolution put Fidel Castro in power.
Despite claims they are supported by thousands of Cubans, Farrar said "informal polls we have carried out among visa and refugee applicants have shown virtually no awareness of dissident personalities or agendas."
He described the dissident movement as largely ineffectual, due to factors including internal conflict, outsized egos, preoccupation with money, outdated agendas and infiltration by the Cuban government.
"The greatest effort is directed at obtaining enough resources to keep the principal organizers and their key supporters living from day to day," Farrar wrote.
MONEY AND MISTRUST
He told of one political party organization that told him "quite openly and frankly it needed resources to pay salaries" and presented him "with a budget in hopes the (interests section) would be able to cover it."
"With seeking resources as a primary concern, the next most important pursuit seems to be to limit or marginalize the activities of erstwhile allies, thus preserving power and access to scarce resources," he said.
Cuba views dissidents as mercenaries in the pay of the United States and allied with anti-Castro Cuban exiles.
Farrar said dissidents get "much of their resources" from exile groups, but also look upon the exiles with suspicion.
"Opposition members of all stripes complain the intention of the exiles is to undercut local opposition groups so that they can move into power when the Castros leave," he wrote.
Dissident leaders tend to be "comparatively old" and out of touch with a Cuban society less concerned with freeing political prisoners than "having greater opportunities to travel freely and live comfortably," Farrar wrote.
He said a new generation of "non-traditional dissidents," such as internationally known blogger Yoani Sanchez, will likely have more impact in post-Castro Cuba, but that "the most immediate successors to the Castro regime will probably come from within the middle ranks of the government itself."
Farrar's cable was written before President Raul Castro, in apparent response to international pressure and dissident activities, agreed in July to release political prisoners.
So far, more than 50 have been freed, with almost all going to Spain in an agreement with the Spanish government.
Long-time dissident Elizardo Sanchez, head of the independent Cuban Commission of Human Rights, told Reuters he did not feel out of touch with younger Cubans, but said there was an occasional "generational rupture" among Cuba's opposition.
Still, he admitted, "There comes the moment when we must retire from the scene. That appears to me convenient from all points of view."
(Additional reporting by Rosa Tania Valdes and Esteban Israel; Editing by Todd Eastham)
(Reuters) - Despite years of U.S. political and financial support for Cuban dissidents, the top U.S. diplomat in Havana said opposition leaders are largely unknown, badly divided and unlikely to ever run the country, according to a secret diplomatic cable obtained by WikiLeaks.
U.S. Interests Section chief Jonathan Farrar said the dissidents deserved backing as the "conscience of Cuba," but Washington "should look elsewhere, including within the government itself, to spot likely successors to the Castro regime."
"We see very little evidence that the mainline dissident organizations have much resonance among ordinary Cubans," Farrar said. Without changes, he said, "the traditional dissident movement is not likely to supplant the Cuban government."
The cable, published on Thursday by Spanish newspaper El Pais, is one of 250,000 confidential U.S. diplomatic cables Wikileaks has begun issuing on the Internet and provided to a number of media outlets.
Farrar's comments, made in a cable dated April 15, 2009, raise questions about the wisdom of the United States' longtime policy of supporting Cuban dissidents as an alternative to the Communist government that has ruled the island since a 1959 revolution put Fidel Castro in power.
Despite claims they are supported by thousands of Cubans, Farrar said "informal polls we have carried out among visa and refugee applicants have shown virtually no awareness of dissident personalities or agendas."
He described the dissident movement as largely ineffectual, due to factors including internal conflict, outsized egos, preoccupation with money, outdated agendas and infiltration by the Cuban government.
"The greatest effort is directed at obtaining enough resources to keep the principal organizers and their key supporters living from day to day," Farrar wrote.
MONEY AND MISTRUST
He told of one political party organization that told him "quite openly and frankly it needed resources to pay salaries" and presented him "with a budget in hopes the (interests section) would be able to cover it."
"With seeking resources as a primary concern, the next most important pursuit seems to be to limit or marginalize the activities of erstwhile allies, thus preserving power and access to scarce resources," he said.
Cuba views dissidents as mercenaries in the pay of the United States and allied with anti-Castro Cuban exiles.
Farrar said dissidents get "much of their resources" from exile groups, but also look upon the exiles with suspicion.
"Opposition members of all stripes complain the intention of the exiles is to undercut local opposition groups so that they can move into power when the Castros leave," he wrote.
Dissident leaders tend to be "comparatively old" and out of touch with a Cuban society less concerned with freeing political prisoners than "having greater opportunities to travel freely and live comfortably," Farrar wrote.
He said a new generation of "non-traditional dissidents," such as internationally known blogger Yoani Sanchez, will likely have more impact in post-Castro Cuba, but that "the most immediate successors to the Castro regime will probably come from within the middle ranks of the government itself."
Farrar's cable was written before President Raul Castro, in apparent response to international pressure and dissident activities, agreed in July to release political prisoners.
So far, more than 50 have been freed, with almost all going to Spain in an agreement with the Spanish government.
Long-time dissident Elizardo Sanchez, head of the independent Cuban Commission of Human Rights, told Reuters he did not feel out of touch with younger Cubans, but said there was an occasional "generational rupture" among Cuba's opposition.
Still, he admitted, "There comes the moment when we must retire from the scene. That appears to me convenient from all points of view."
(Additional reporting by Rosa Tania Valdes and Esteban Israel; Editing by Todd Eastham)
Wikileaks Cables Reveal Two-Faced Politics by US
By Ángel Páez
LIMA, Dec 16, 2010 (IPS) - "It’s not surprising for the United States to cooperate with military or government officials in Peru about which it has information linking them to serious crimes," said activist Ricardo Soberón, referring to contradictions revealed in cables released by the whistle-blowing website Wikileaks.
Soberón, with the non-governmental Centre for Research on Drugs and Human Rights (CIDDH), says "since 1987, the U.S. Department of State has been concerned about the risk of corruption among the Peruvian military in drug trafficking zones, but that concern has not been shared by the Pentagon (Department of Defence), which was more interested in expanding its missions in the Andes region, without regard to the costs."
"The leaked cables reflect a deep political contradiction between Washington’s institutional diplomacy, and the military diplomacy characterised by the promotion of strategies like (the U.S.-financed counterinsurgency and anti-drug strategy) Plan Colombia, the Merida Initiative (a multi-billion dollar U.S. counter-drug assistance programme for Mexico and Central America), hot pursuit across borders, or the ‘hammer and anvil’ tactic in the Colombian armed conflict," he told IPS.
"The revelations by the cables represent a continuity of these dichotomies in the discourse and practices of U.S. agencies with different objectives and interests in the region," he said.
A Mar. 12, 2009 cable sent by then-U.S. Ambassador in Lima Michael McKinley, which was released by WikiLeaks and published by the El Pais newspaper in Spain, says army commanders fighting remnants of the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) Maoist rebels received "lucrative payoffs from drug traffickers."
The sources cited by the document referred to drug traffickers operating in league with Sendero insurgents in the Apurimac and Ene River Valley (VRAE) region, and contended that "the army -- for fear of disrupting these drug trafficking networks and losing access to payoffs -- is unwilling to commit the large force needed to pacify the VRAE."
But at the same time, the U.S. embassy has pressed for Washington to respond to requests by Peru’s army brass for increased military aid to squelch Sendero, according to seven confidential cables dated 2009, which were among the thousands of documents released by Wikileaks.
Despite McKinley’s serious allegations of drug corruption against Peruvian army officers fighting in the VRAE, Peru’s main cocaine-producing region, just eight months later, on Nov. 25, 2009, the ambassador himself asked the chief of the U.S. Southern Command for greater aid to the Peruvian army in its fight against Sendero.
The cable, addressed to Commander Douglas M. Fraser, who was preparing to visit Lima in the first week of December 2009, stated that "Your visit affords an opportunity to underscore USG (U.S. government) interest in supporting the GOP's (government of Peru) efforts to combat these threats in the several discrete areas where we are best positioned to help.
"The key word, however, is ‘supporting’," the ambassador stressed. "In this context, the GOP needs to develop a more effective political/military strategy for turning the tide against a reemerging SL (Sendero Luminoso) increasingly intertwined with drug trafficking."
According to other cables from McKinley, the equipment sought by the Peruvian armed forces included helicopters with electronic surveillance system capabilities, technology to detect and destroy the insurgents’ home-made explosive devices, and infrared cameras and night vision equipment.
Peru received 56.4 million dollars in military and police aid in 2006, making it the second biggest recipient in Latin America after Colombia, which received nearly 582 million dollars, according to Just the Facts, a joint project of the Centre for International Policy, the Latin America Working Group Education Fund, and the Washington Office on Latin America that offers "a civilian’s guide to U.S. defence and security assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean".
For the 2011 budget, Washington has set the aid for Peru at 44.7 million dollars, a substantial reduction. This South American country is now in third place for such funds in the region, after Colombia (351 million dollars) and Mexico (147.9 million dollars).
"We don’t tell the United States how it should fight in Afghanistan," said retired admiral Jorge Montoya, a former commander of Peru's joint chiefs of staff. "In any case, if the United States wants to intervene in the war against Sendero Luminoso, it should make that clear. They only cooperate in the fight against drug trafficking.
"The military combat Sendero Luminoso with all the available resources, which often fall short, and in terrible, adverse conditions, and we are going to defeat them with our own means. We don’t need intervention by the U.S. military," he told IPS.
Montoya, who is now an adviser to Defence Minister Jaime Thorne, said he shared the U.S. concern for the results of the conflict.
"It is a very complicated war against a fanatical ideological organisation that operates in a remote geographical area with which it is highly familiar because it has been there for years. But as far as I know, the United States has not set a deadline, and shouldn't, because we are a sovereign country."
In the Mar. 12, 2009 cable, McKinley also notes that under the government of Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000), government officials cooperating with the United States in the fight against drugs at the same time received payoffs to cooperate with drug traffickers.
"Former President Alberto Fujimori's (1990-2000) intelligence chief Vladimiro Montesinos, for example, collaborated with top army and other security officials to develop a web of protection for favoured drug traffickers while cooperating with U.S. officials to combat others," McKinley wrote.
He did not mention that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) financed an anti-narcotics unit organised by Montesinos in the notorious National Intelligence Service (SIN), despite reports of the involvement by Fujimori’s eminence grise in corruption, drug trafficking and human rights violations
One of the most powerful Peruvian druglords of the 1990s, Demetrio Chávez, testified in court that he paid 50,000 dollars a month in bribes to Montesinos and several army officers.
Nevertheless, the Peruvian courts have not yet managed to specifically find Montesinos -- who is in prison on numerous human rights and corruption charges -- guilty of drug trafficking. Nor has any member of the military high command from the years when Montesinos was the power behind the throne been sentenced.
"It is pitiable that Peruvian democracy has not yet been able to convict Montesinos for his ties with drug trafficking," José Robles, a former army officer who is an analyst of military affairs at the non-governmental Freedom and Democracy Institute (IDL), told IPS.
"However, we cannot generalise about cases of corruption that may exist," he added. "The majority of military personnel have returned to their roots, to the training they received. Those who believe that just because someone wears a uniform, he will behave in a ‘Montesinista’ fashion, are mistaken."
LIMA, Dec 16, 2010 (IPS) - "It’s not surprising for the United States to cooperate with military or government officials in Peru about which it has information linking them to serious crimes," said activist Ricardo Soberón, referring to contradictions revealed in cables released by the whistle-blowing website Wikileaks.
Soberón, with the non-governmental Centre for Research on Drugs and Human Rights (CIDDH), says "since 1987, the U.S. Department of State has been concerned about the risk of corruption among the Peruvian military in drug trafficking zones, but that concern has not been shared by the Pentagon (Department of Defence), which was more interested in expanding its missions in the Andes region, without regard to the costs."
"The leaked cables reflect a deep political contradiction between Washington’s institutional diplomacy, and the military diplomacy characterised by the promotion of strategies like (the U.S.-financed counterinsurgency and anti-drug strategy) Plan Colombia, the Merida Initiative (a multi-billion dollar U.S. counter-drug assistance programme for Mexico and Central America), hot pursuit across borders, or the ‘hammer and anvil’ tactic in the Colombian armed conflict," he told IPS.
"The revelations by the cables represent a continuity of these dichotomies in the discourse and practices of U.S. agencies with different objectives and interests in the region," he said.
A Mar. 12, 2009 cable sent by then-U.S. Ambassador in Lima Michael McKinley, which was released by WikiLeaks and published by the El Pais newspaper in Spain, says army commanders fighting remnants of the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) Maoist rebels received "lucrative payoffs from drug traffickers."
The sources cited by the document referred to drug traffickers operating in league with Sendero insurgents in the Apurimac and Ene River Valley (VRAE) region, and contended that "the army -- for fear of disrupting these drug trafficking networks and losing access to payoffs -- is unwilling to commit the large force needed to pacify the VRAE."
But at the same time, the U.S. embassy has pressed for Washington to respond to requests by Peru’s army brass for increased military aid to squelch Sendero, according to seven confidential cables dated 2009, which were among the thousands of documents released by Wikileaks.
Despite McKinley’s serious allegations of drug corruption against Peruvian army officers fighting in the VRAE, Peru’s main cocaine-producing region, just eight months later, on Nov. 25, 2009, the ambassador himself asked the chief of the U.S. Southern Command for greater aid to the Peruvian army in its fight against Sendero.
The cable, addressed to Commander Douglas M. Fraser, who was preparing to visit Lima in the first week of December 2009, stated that "Your visit affords an opportunity to underscore USG (U.S. government) interest in supporting the GOP's (government of Peru) efforts to combat these threats in the several discrete areas where we are best positioned to help.
"The key word, however, is ‘supporting’," the ambassador stressed. "In this context, the GOP needs to develop a more effective political/military strategy for turning the tide against a reemerging SL (Sendero Luminoso) increasingly intertwined with drug trafficking."
According to other cables from McKinley, the equipment sought by the Peruvian armed forces included helicopters with electronic surveillance system capabilities, technology to detect and destroy the insurgents’ home-made explosive devices, and infrared cameras and night vision equipment.
Peru received 56.4 million dollars in military and police aid in 2006, making it the second biggest recipient in Latin America after Colombia, which received nearly 582 million dollars, according to Just the Facts, a joint project of the Centre for International Policy, the Latin America Working Group Education Fund, and the Washington Office on Latin America that offers "a civilian’s guide to U.S. defence and security assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean".
For the 2011 budget, Washington has set the aid for Peru at 44.7 million dollars, a substantial reduction. This South American country is now in third place for such funds in the region, after Colombia (351 million dollars) and Mexico (147.9 million dollars).
"We don’t tell the United States how it should fight in Afghanistan," said retired admiral Jorge Montoya, a former commander of Peru's joint chiefs of staff. "In any case, if the United States wants to intervene in the war against Sendero Luminoso, it should make that clear. They only cooperate in the fight against drug trafficking.
"The military combat Sendero Luminoso with all the available resources, which often fall short, and in terrible, adverse conditions, and we are going to defeat them with our own means. We don’t need intervention by the U.S. military," he told IPS.
Montoya, who is now an adviser to Defence Minister Jaime Thorne, said he shared the U.S. concern for the results of the conflict.
"It is a very complicated war against a fanatical ideological organisation that operates in a remote geographical area with which it is highly familiar because it has been there for years. But as far as I know, the United States has not set a deadline, and shouldn't, because we are a sovereign country."
In the Mar. 12, 2009 cable, McKinley also notes that under the government of Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000), government officials cooperating with the United States in the fight against drugs at the same time received payoffs to cooperate with drug traffickers.
"Former President Alberto Fujimori's (1990-2000) intelligence chief Vladimiro Montesinos, for example, collaborated with top army and other security officials to develop a web of protection for favoured drug traffickers while cooperating with U.S. officials to combat others," McKinley wrote.
He did not mention that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) financed an anti-narcotics unit organised by Montesinos in the notorious National Intelligence Service (SIN), despite reports of the involvement by Fujimori’s eminence grise in corruption, drug trafficking and human rights violations
One of the most powerful Peruvian druglords of the 1990s, Demetrio Chávez, testified in court that he paid 50,000 dollars a month in bribes to Montesinos and several army officers.
Nevertheless, the Peruvian courts have not yet managed to specifically find Montesinos -- who is in prison on numerous human rights and corruption charges -- guilty of drug trafficking. Nor has any member of the military high command from the years when Montesinos was the power behind the throne been sentenced.
"It is pitiable that Peruvian democracy has not yet been able to convict Montesinos for his ties with drug trafficking," José Robles, a former army officer who is an analyst of military affairs at the non-governmental Freedom and Democracy Institute (IDL), told IPS.
"However, we cannot generalise about cases of corruption that may exist," he added. "The majority of military personnel have returned to their roots, to the training they received. Those who believe that just because someone wears a uniform, he will behave in a ‘Montesinista’ fashion, are mistaken."
US helped subvert Colombia’s congress on military ‘escalation’ deal, cable shows
By Stephen C. Webster
A year before the United States and Colombia announced an enhanced military cooperation agreement, the US embassy in Bogotá was working with the administration of Colombian president Álvaro Uribe Vélez to dodge congressional approval of the deal, which saw US troops stationed in the nation and inflamed regional tensions.
The revelation was made in a confidential US diplomatic cable composed in Nov. 2008, given to secrets outlet WikiLeaks and republished on Dec. 18. It was forwarded with priority to US embassies in Brasilia, Caracas, Lima, Panama, Quito and to officials in Washington, DC and the US Southern Command.
The document specified that by renaming the multilateral agreement, "a major escalation in US engagement" would become "simply an extension of our existing cooperation."
The deal to station US troops in Colombia was announced in the summer of 2009 and finalized in October. Then-President Álvaro Uribe Vélez has since been succeeded by Juan Manuel Santos, Colombia's former secretary of defense, who took office in August.
Amid negotiations with US officials, the Colombian administration issued a counter-proposal which the US embassy in Bogotá analyzed to make recommendations for Washington strategists. The document it produced noted that the administration wanted to avoid "use of the word' base'" in describing US installations. They also insisted upon finding a way to "place the agreement under the umbrella of existing bilateral and multilateral accords to avoid the need for Colombian congressional approval."
In order to do that, Colombian officials engaged in wordplay, renaming a US proposal for a "Defense Cooperation Agreement" to the much-less descriptive "Supplemental Agreement for Cooperation and Technical Assistance." The rephrasing shows that both US and Colombian officials knew their deal would not fall within the boundaries of standing agreements without significant alterations to its framing.
The US embassy at Bogotá concurred with the suggested changes, noting that a less descriptive title would shift the troop deal from "a major escalation in US engagement" to "simply an extension of our existing cooperation."
"[Tying] the agreement to existing bilateral and multilateral agreements does not impact U.S. interests and is important to the GOC's capacity to conclude an accord. If we can get the access and authorities we need by changing the title, we recommend changing the title."
Sure enough, it worked: Colombia's defense minister said in July, 2009 that no congressional approval was needed for the administration to allow foreign troops.
The Colombian administration also asked for the US to build strategic air defense installations, but US officials noted that could cost billions of dollars and should only be considered if it's absolutely necessary.
When the US announced its deal with Colombia, officials said it was only to operate drone aircraft in the region, to aid the US war on drugs and help protect Colombia from terrorism.
Venezuela, which shares a border with the South American nation, took the agreement as a sign that Colombia was preparing for war. Tensions have run high between the two nations ever since.
The prior president of Colombia has been dogged by protesters ever since leaving office. Critics charge he presided over one of the nation's worst periods for human rights, during which labor leaders and thousands of civilians were slaughtered by former government paramilitary groups.
Human Rights Watch claimed in a report earlier this year that when the prior government displaced tens of thousands of soldiers between 2003 and 2006, their ties to the administration did not really end.
In his inaugural address, Colombian President Santos said his nation would have peace "by reason or force."
Another diplomatic cable released last week revealed that Colombia's last administration also pushed the US to engage in a public campaign to discredit Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez.
A year before the United States and Colombia announced an enhanced military cooperation agreement, the US embassy in Bogotá was working with the administration of Colombian president Álvaro Uribe Vélez to dodge congressional approval of the deal, which saw US troops stationed in the nation and inflamed regional tensions.
The revelation was made in a confidential US diplomatic cable composed in Nov. 2008, given to secrets outlet WikiLeaks and republished on Dec. 18. It was forwarded with priority to US embassies in Brasilia, Caracas, Lima, Panama, Quito and to officials in Washington, DC and the US Southern Command.
The document specified that by renaming the multilateral agreement, "a major escalation in US engagement" would become "simply an extension of our existing cooperation."
The deal to station US troops in Colombia was announced in the summer of 2009 and finalized in October. Then-President Álvaro Uribe Vélez has since been succeeded by Juan Manuel Santos, Colombia's former secretary of defense, who took office in August.
Amid negotiations with US officials, the Colombian administration issued a counter-proposal which the US embassy in Bogotá analyzed to make recommendations for Washington strategists. The document it produced noted that the administration wanted to avoid "use of the word' base'" in describing US installations. They also insisted upon finding a way to "place the agreement under the umbrella of existing bilateral and multilateral accords to avoid the need for Colombian congressional approval."
In order to do that, Colombian officials engaged in wordplay, renaming a US proposal for a "Defense Cooperation Agreement" to the much-less descriptive "Supplemental Agreement for Cooperation and Technical Assistance." The rephrasing shows that both US and Colombian officials knew their deal would not fall within the boundaries of standing agreements without significant alterations to its framing.
The US embassy at Bogotá concurred with the suggested changes, noting that a less descriptive title would shift the troop deal from "a major escalation in US engagement" to "simply an extension of our existing cooperation."
"[Tying] the agreement to existing bilateral and multilateral agreements does not impact U.S. interests and is important to the GOC's capacity to conclude an accord. If we can get the access and authorities we need by changing the title, we recommend changing the title."
Sure enough, it worked: Colombia's defense minister said in July, 2009 that no congressional approval was needed for the administration to allow foreign troops.
The Colombian administration also asked for the US to build strategic air defense installations, but US officials noted that could cost billions of dollars and should only be considered if it's absolutely necessary.
When the US announced its deal with Colombia, officials said it was only to operate drone aircraft in the region, to aid the US war on drugs and help protect Colombia from terrorism.
Venezuela, which shares a border with the South American nation, took the agreement as a sign that Colombia was preparing for war. Tensions have run high between the two nations ever since.
The prior president of Colombia has been dogged by protesters ever since leaving office. Critics charge he presided over one of the nation's worst periods for human rights, during which labor leaders and thousands of civilians were slaughtered by former government paramilitary groups.
Human Rights Watch claimed in a report earlier this year that when the prior government displaced tens of thousands of soldiers between 2003 and 2006, their ties to the administration did not really end.
In his inaugural address, Colombian President Santos said his nation would have peace "by reason or force."
Another diplomatic cable released last week revealed that Colombia's last administration also pushed the US to engage in a public campaign to discredit Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez.
The U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement is One More Threat against Afro-Colombian Communities
“We have to stand for human rights, and that should be part of the trade equation.”
President Obama.
These words expressed by President Obama during his electoral campaign have become a
rhetoric that could cost Colombia’s Afrodescendants the legal achievements they have
won in their struggle for self-determination and recognition of their rights. It could also
cost them the ancestral territories they have defended for centuries. That is, if President
Obama insists on Congressional approval of the Free Trade Agreement with Colombia.
The struggle of Afro-descendant communities for their ancestral lands and economic,
environmental and cultural rights has led to deaths of more than 47 leaders, massacres of
dozens of innocent Afro-descendants, internal displacement of more than 1.5 million
people, the loss of their control over their collective territories, and acceleration of these
communities’ impoverishment.
The port of Buenaventura and Northern Cauca zone where development-driven economic
policies were imposed against these communities’ will has created serious social and
environmental problems. Such policies have generated food and humanitarian crises
throughout the territory-region of the Pacific Coast and parts of the Caribbean. They
have also led to the illegal, and often violent, expropriation of territories for the large-
scale cultivation of oil palm and other large-scale economic projects in the collective
territories of Alto Mira and Frontera (Nariño) and Jiguamiandó and Curvaradó (Chocó).
The U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement is just one more mechanism that will
endanger the rights of Afro-descendant and indigenous communities in Colombia. As we
have previously stated, the approval of the US-Colombia FTA will bring about conditions
that will violate the economic, environmental, territorial, and intellectual property rights
of these communities. It will exacerbate the racial, economic and environmental
injustices that have affected these populations for centuries.
We remind President Obama and the legislators who favor the FTA in the United States
that the Afro-descendant communities continue to face violence due to the presence of
illegal armed groups and actors that form part of the internal armed conflict in Afro-
Colombian territories. For the past two years, paramilitary groups known as the Black
Eagles, Rastrojos, and New Generation have systematically threatened Afro-Colombian
leaders and their organizations. Internationally recognized Afro-descendant organizations
including AFRODES and the Black Communities’ Process (PCN) are currently military
objectives for these groups. In the port of Buenaventura alone, the Human Rights
Ombudsman’s office documented 357 forced disappearances in the last three years (an
official statistic that does not reflect the actual number of forced disappearances in the
city), and an average 500 violent deaths a year for the last five years. This discriminatory
violence does not simply respond to a lack of economic opportunities, instead it responds
to the interests of different economic and political sectors in the territories and resources
of the region.
In the territory-region of the Pacific, the violence and implementation of Plan Colombia
are responsible for the impoverishment of the Afro-Colombian population in the last ten
years. 72% of Afro-descendants have lost their means of self-sustenance (one of which is
the land that is their primary source of work). 78% of internal displacement between
2002 and 2009 came from the collective territories of Afro-descendants and has left
96.5% of the forcibly displaced persons in conditions of extreme poverty, 78.4% of
which live in conditions of indigent poverty. Forced displacement, as indicated by the
Colombian Constitutional Court in Order T-025 of 2004 and Orders 004, 005, and 092 of
2009, is caused by discriminate violence against the communities, armed confrontation,
and military actions of counter-insurgency, fumigations with glyphosate on subsistence
crops of the communities, racial discrimination and the exclusion of black people from
spaces and critical actions in decision making. We remind President Obama and the
legislators that the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement was formulated and will be
applied in an environment of discriminate violence, violation of rights and without the
previous consultation with the communities whose territories, resources, and rights will
be directly affected by it.
President Obama has argued that in order to achieve peace, economic stability is
required. He has used this argument in favor of the Free Trade Agreements with South
Korea, Panama, and Colombia. In the reality of Colombia and the Afro-descendant
communities, peace would require the government of Colombia to recognize the
existence of paramilitary groups and the impact of their actions on democracy and the
possibility for peace. The government of Colombia would also have to decisively
guarantee justice and reparation for the victims of their actions. It would also require that
the Colombian government guarantee forcibly displaced, expropriated and impoverished
communities conditions for restitution, reparation and return to their territories in a way
that would reestablish their lives under dignified conditions. It also requires the creation
of differential attention policies for internally displaced Afro-descendents so that they can
recuperate their possessions and sources of work and employment (which include
recuperation of their lands), and that they are reintegrated into their productive
livelihoods with conditions of competition and equality that correlates with the rest of
society. This requires respect for their right to free and informed previous consultation as
obliged by Convention 169 of the ILO, the Colombian Constitution, and Law 170 of
1993.
We, the communities and organizations that struggle for our territorial, economic and
political self-determination, find that the Colombian government does not have any
political will to respect to the rule of law or the rights that are due to us. The Colombian
government has been characterized by its inability to implement regulations such as
Order 005 of 2009, which obliges the government to define appropriate prevention and
attention plans for Afro-descendant communities that are vulnerable to forced
displacement. The Colombian government violates the rights to free and informed
previous consultation and consent. Our last experience with this issue has been during
the formulation of the National Development Plan (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo), where
the Colombian government deliberately has limited the obligations of a transparent
previous consultation process to bureaucratic meetings where the direct voice of the
communities that will be affected by those decisions has not been represented. Likewise
the FTA was formulated behind the back of these communities making it a new
mechanism of expropriation and violation of rights.
The grassroots Afro-Colombian communities defend a Life Project (Proyecto de Vida),
based on principles of equality, sustainability, self-determination and self-affirmation,
that the US-Colombia FTA threatens, as there are not democratic conditions in Colombia
for the economic, political and social participation of our people. We make it clear that
despite President Juan Manuel Santos’ rhetoric, his decisions and actions against the
rights of our communities as Minister of Defense during President Uribe’s
administration, do not give us any hope that conditions will get better during his
administration. His policy in regards to mining, the Land Law and the poorly named
consultation process on the National Development Plan are concrete examples.
Therefore, the organizations and communities that struggle for the protection of our
ancestral territories, the resources within the territories and our rights to them,
reiterate our opposition to the current U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement, as it is
not a choice that favors sustainable development in the future and favorable
advancement for our communities, in full exercise of our constitutional and human
rights.
We ask that the United Status Congress condition any future discussion of the FTA with
Colombia in compliance with the recommendations that all sectors of the national and
international social movements have presented in addition to the observations presented
last year to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.
We make a similar appeal to civil society in the United States to demand their
representatives to publicly oppose the FTA with Colombia until the Colombian
government can demonstrate concrete results in transforming the human rights situation
in Afro-descendant communities.
With our traditional affirmation of life and joy, hope and freedom,
Black Communities’ Process (PCN)∗
National Coordination
International Working Group
President Obama.
These words expressed by President Obama during his electoral campaign have become a
rhetoric that could cost Colombia’s Afrodescendants the legal achievements they have
won in their struggle for self-determination and recognition of their rights. It could also
cost them the ancestral territories they have defended for centuries. That is, if President
Obama insists on Congressional approval of the Free Trade Agreement with Colombia.
The struggle of Afro-descendant communities for their ancestral lands and economic,
environmental and cultural rights has led to deaths of more than 47 leaders, massacres of
dozens of innocent Afro-descendants, internal displacement of more than 1.5 million
people, the loss of their control over their collective territories, and acceleration of these
communities’ impoverishment.
The port of Buenaventura and Northern Cauca zone where development-driven economic
policies were imposed against these communities’ will has created serious social and
environmental problems. Such policies have generated food and humanitarian crises
throughout the territory-region of the Pacific Coast and parts of the Caribbean. They
have also led to the illegal, and often violent, expropriation of territories for the large-
scale cultivation of oil palm and other large-scale economic projects in the collective
territories of Alto Mira and Frontera (Nariño) and Jiguamiandó and Curvaradó (Chocó).
The U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement is just one more mechanism that will
endanger the rights of Afro-descendant and indigenous communities in Colombia. As we
have previously stated, the approval of the US-Colombia FTA will bring about conditions
that will violate the economic, environmental, territorial, and intellectual property rights
of these communities. It will exacerbate the racial, economic and environmental
injustices that have affected these populations for centuries.
We remind President Obama and the legislators who favor the FTA in the United States
that the Afro-descendant communities continue to face violence due to the presence of
illegal armed groups and actors that form part of the internal armed conflict in Afro-
Colombian territories. For the past two years, paramilitary groups known as the Black
Eagles, Rastrojos, and New Generation have systematically threatened Afro-Colombian
leaders and their organizations. Internationally recognized Afro-descendant organizations
including AFRODES and the Black Communities’ Process (PCN) are currently military
objectives for these groups. In the port of Buenaventura alone, the Human Rights
Ombudsman’s office documented 357 forced disappearances in the last three years (an
official statistic that does not reflect the actual number of forced disappearances in the
city), and an average 500 violent deaths a year for the last five years. This discriminatory
violence does not simply respond to a lack of economic opportunities, instead it responds
to the interests of different economic and political sectors in the territories and resources
of the region.
In the territory-region of the Pacific, the violence and implementation of Plan Colombia
are responsible for the impoverishment of the Afro-Colombian population in the last ten
years. 72% of Afro-descendants have lost their means of self-sustenance (one of which is
the land that is their primary source of work). 78% of internal displacement between
2002 and 2009 came from the collective territories of Afro-descendants and has left
96.5% of the forcibly displaced persons in conditions of extreme poverty, 78.4% of
which live in conditions of indigent poverty. Forced displacement, as indicated by the
Colombian Constitutional Court in Order T-025 of 2004 and Orders 004, 005, and 092 of
2009, is caused by discriminate violence against the communities, armed confrontation,
and military actions of counter-insurgency, fumigations with glyphosate on subsistence
crops of the communities, racial discrimination and the exclusion of black people from
spaces and critical actions in decision making. We remind President Obama and the
legislators that the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement was formulated and will be
applied in an environment of discriminate violence, violation of rights and without the
previous consultation with the communities whose territories, resources, and rights will
be directly affected by it.
President Obama has argued that in order to achieve peace, economic stability is
required. He has used this argument in favor of the Free Trade Agreements with South
Korea, Panama, and Colombia. In the reality of Colombia and the Afro-descendant
communities, peace would require the government of Colombia to recognize the
existence of paramilitary groups and the impact of their actions on democracy and the
possibility for peace. The government of Colombia would also have to decisively
guarantee justice and reparation for the victims of their actions. It would also require that
the Colombian government guarantee forcibly displaced, expropriated and impoverished
communities conditions for restitution, reparation and return to their territories in a way
that would reestablish their lives under dignified conditions. It also requires the creation
of differential attention policies for internally displaced Afro-descendents so that they can
recuperate their possessions and sources of work and employment (which include
recuperation of their lands), and that they are reintegrated into their productive
livelihoods with conditions of competition and equality that correlates with the rest of
society. This requires respect for their right to free and informed previous consultation as
obliged by Convention 169 of the ILO, the Colombian Constitution, and Law 170 of
1993.
We, the communities and organizations that struggle for our territorial, economic and
political self-determination, find that the Colombian government does not have any
political will to respect to the rule of law or the rights that are due to us. The Colombian
government has been characterized by its inability to implement regulations such as
Order 005 of 2009, which obliges the government to define appropriate prevention and
attention plans for Afro-descendant communities that are vulnerable to forced
displacement. The Colombian government violates the rights to free and informed
previous consultation and consent. Our last experience with this issue has been during
the formulation of the National Development Plan (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo), where
the Colombian government deliberately has limited the obligations of a transparent
previous consultation process to bureaucratic meetings where the direct voice of the
communities that will be affected by those decisions has not been represented. Likewise
the FTA was formulated behind the back of these communities making it a new
mechanism of expropriation and violation of rights.
The grassroots Afro-Colombian communities defend a Life Project (Proyecto de Vida),
based on principles of equality, sustainability, self-determination and self-affirmation,
that the US-Colombia FTA threatens, as there are not democratic conditions in Colombia
for the economic, political and social participation of our people. We make it clear that
despite President Juan Manuel Santos’ rhetoric, his decisions and actions against the
rights of our communities as Minister of Defense during President Uribe’s
administration, do not give us any hope that conditions will get better during his
administration. His policy in regards to mining, the Land Law and the poorly named
consultation process on the National Development Plan are concrete examples.
Therefore, the organizations and communities that struggle for the protection of our
ancestral territories, the resources within the territories and our rights to them,
reiterate our opposition to the current U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement, as it is
not a choice that favors sustainable development in the future and favorable
advancement for our communities, in full exercise of our constitutional and human
rights.
We ask that the United Status Congress condition any future discussion of the FTA with
Colombia in compliance with the recommendations that all sectors of the national and
international social movements have presented in addition to the observations presented
last year to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.
We make a similar appeal to civil society in the United States to demand their
representatives to publicly oppose the FTA with Colombia until the Colombian
government can demonstrate concrete results in transforming the human rights situation
in Afro-descendant communities.
With our traditional affirmation of life and joy, hope and freedom,
Black Communities’ Process (PCN)∗
National Coordination
International Working Group
Wednesday, December 22, 2010
Chile lawyer seeks arrests in folk singer's death
By EVA VERGARA
The Associated Press
Tuesday, December 21, 2010; 8:25 PM
SANTIAGO, Chile -- A Chilean government lawyer is seeking to arrest four retired army officers for the killing of renowned folk singer Victor Jara during the 1973 coup.
The Interior Ministry's Human Rights Program submitted a formal request for their detention to Judge Juan Fuentes Belmar on Tuesday, according to an official familiar with the case. The official spoke to The Associated Press on condition of anonymity to avoid influencing the magistrate's decision.
The case targets retired officers Edwin Dimter, Hugo Sanchez and Raul Jofre, and ex-prosecutor Rolando Melo, the official said.
Jara, a folk singer, theater director, communist and outspoken supporter of socialist President Salvador Allende, was detained in a stadium along with 5,000 other leftists when Gen. Augusto Pinochet took power in a military coup on Sept. 11, 1973. Pulled from the crowd, Jara was tortured and shot to death by the military as a message to the rest.
The killing turned Jara into an international symbol of resistance to the Pinochet government, which lasted until 1990.
Some witnesses have accused Dimter of being a military officer long known only as "The Prince," who led torture and killings at the stadiums and is believed responsible for Jara's death.
Dimter has denied killing Jara and sued a journalist who wrote an article identifying him as "The Prince."
So far the only person to be prosecuted for Jara's killing is former conscript Jose Paredes Marquez, 56, who proclaims his innocence.
In an interview with the AP last year, Paredes said all conscripts were carrying machine guns and Jara's body would have been torn apart by such a weapon.
An autopsy from 2009 found that the folk singer died from dozens of gunshot wounds all over his body, and the singer's widow, Joan Jara, has said she had no difficulty recognizing his remains.
Tuesday's petition seeking the arrest warrants was filed by lawyer Cristian Cruz of the Human Rights Program.
Cruz and a colleague were recently laid off, effective Jan. 1, by the center-right government of Sebastian Pinera, which cited budgetary pressures.
The Associated Press
Tuesday, December 21, 2010; 8:25 PM
SANTIAGO, Chile -- A Chilean government lawyer is seeking to arrest four retired army officers for the killing of renowned folk singer Victor Jara during the 1973 coup.
The Interior Ministry's Human Rights Program submitted a formal request for their detention to Judge Juan Fuentes Belmar on Tuesday, according to an official familiar with the case. The official spoke to The Associated Press on condition of anonymity to avoid influencing the magistrate's decision.
The case targets retired officers Edwin Dimter, Hugo Sanchez and Raul Jofre, and ex-prosecutor Rolando Melo, the official said.
Jara, a folk singer, theater director, communist and outspoken supporter of socialist President Salvador Allende, was detained in a stadium along with 5,000 other leftists when Gen. Augusto Pinochet took power in a military coup on Sept. 11, 1973. Pulled from the crowd, Jara was tortured and shot to death by the military as a message to the rest.
The killing turned Jara into an international symbol of resistance to the Pinochet government, which lasted until 1990.
Some witnesses have accused Dimter of being a military officer long known only as "The Prince," who led torture and killings at the stadiums and is believed responsible for Jara's death.
Dimter has denied killing Jara and sued a journalist who wrote an article identifying him as "The Prince."
So far the only person to be prosecuted for Jara's killing is former conscript Jose Paredes Marquez, 56, who proclaims his innocence.
In an interview with the AP last year, Paredes said all conscripts were carrying machine guns and Jara's body would have been torn apart by such a weapon.
An autopsy from 2009 found that the folk singer died from dozens of gunshot wounds all over his body, and the singer's widow, Joan Jara, has said she had no difficulty recognizing his remains.
Tuesday's petition seeking the arrest warrants was filed by lawyer Cristian Cruz of the Human Rights Program.
Cruz and a colleague were recently laid off, effective Jan. 1, by the center-right government of Sebastian Pinera, which cited budgetary pressures.
Friday, December 17, 2010
Amnesty for Brazil Dictatorship Is Challenged
By ALEXEI BARRIONUEVO
RIO DE JANEIRO — A human rights court said that a Brazilian amnesty law covering crimes during the country’s 21-year dictatorship was invalid and that the country was responsible for the forced disappearance of at least 70 peasants and militants who were part of a resistance movement.
The ruling was announced Tuesday by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights; the court adheres to the American Convention on Human Rights, to which Brazil is a signatory.
While Argentina and Chile have begun more vigorously investigating and prosecuting human rights violations committed during those countries’ dictatorships, successive Brazilian governments have refused to investigate and find those responsible for crimes committed during the dictatorship that ended in 1985. And Brazil’s Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of the amnesty law, which protects military officials from prosecution for abuses committed during the military regime.
But the Inter-American Court, based in Costa Rica, found that Brazil was responsible for the actions of state agents who carried out disappearances of members of the Araguaia guerrilla movement.
The court said Brazil must conduct a criminal investigation into the Araguaia case, bring the guilty parties to justice, search for those who have disappeared and provide medical and psychological treatment to their surviving relatives. It also said 42 direct relatives of the victims should receive $45,000 each in compensation for their suffering.
“This is a turning point in the search for truth and justice in Brazil,” said Viviana Krsticevic, the executive director of the Center for Justice and International Law, a human rights group involved in the case. “Brazil, unlike other Latin American countries, has not found a way to investigate or even partially punish those responsible for the most egregious human rights violations committed during its dictatorship.”
The responsibility for deciding how to deal with the Inter-American Court’s decision will fall to the president-elect, Dilma Rousseff, a former resistance fighter who was imprisoned and tortured by the military regime. Ms. Rousseff, who takes office on Jan. 1, vowed in the campaign to bring human rights violators from the dictatorship to justice.
President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s government did little to break the pattern of earlier governments in not going after those responsible for the dictatorship’s crimes, reflecting how the military remains an influential political actor in Brazil, Ms. Krsticevic said. His government supported the decision in April by the Supreme Court not to investigate the anti-guerilla military operation in the Araguaia region in that period, as requested by families of the victims. The court cited the 1979 amnesty law in its decision.
In its ruling on Tuesday, the human rights court said, “The provisions of the Brazilian Amnesty Law that prevent the investigation and sanctioning of severe human rights violations are incompatible with the American Convention, have no legal effects and cannot continue to stand in the way of investigating the facts” of the Araguaia case.
On Wednesday, Paulo Vannuchi, Brazil’s departing minister for human rights, called the court’s decision “very important to continuing to develop human rights” in Brazil.
“We need to find the bodies of those resistance fighters and return them to their families,” Mr. Vannuchi said. “This is indispensable to talking about democratic reconciliation, about being one united country.”
Myrna Domit contributed reporting from São Paulo, Brazil.
RIO DE JANEIRO — A human rights court said that a Brazilian amnesty law covering crimes during the country’s 21-year dictatorship was invalid and that the country was responsible for the forced disappearance of at least 70 peasants and militants who were part of a resistance movement.
The ruling was announced Tuesday by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights; the court adheres to the American Convention on Human Rights, to which Brazil is a signatory.
While Argentina and Chile have begun more vigorously investigating and prosecuting human rights violations committed during those countries’ dictatorships, successive Brazilian governments have refused to investigate and find those responsible for crimes committed during the dictatorship that ended in 1985. And Brazil’s Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of the amnesty law, which protects military officials from prosecution for abuses committed during the military regime.
But the Inter-American Court, based in Costa Rica, found that Brazil was responsible for the actions of state agents who carried out disappearances of members of the Araguaia guerrilla movement.
The court said Brazil must conduct a criminal investigation into the Araguaia case, bring the guilty parties to justice, search for those who have disappeared and provide medical and psychological treatment to their surviving relatives. It also said 42 direct relatives of the victims should receive $45,000 each in compensation for their suffering.
“This is a turning point in the search for truth and justice in Brazil,” said Viviana Krsticevic, the executive director of the Center for Justice and International Law, a human rights group involved in the case. “Brazil, unlike other Latin American countries, has not found a way to investigate or even partially punish those responsible for the most egregious human rights violations committed during its dictatorship.”
The responsibility for deciding how to deal with the Inter-American Court’s decision will fall to the president-elect, Dilma Rousseff, a former resistance fighter who was imprisoned and tortured by the military regime. Ms. Rousseff, who takes office on Jan. 1, vowed in the campaign to bring human rights violators from the dictatorship to justice.
President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s government did little to break the pattern of earlier governments in not going after those responsible for the dictatorship’s crimes, reflecting how the military remains an influential political actor in Brazil, Ms. Krsticevic said. His government supported the decision in April by the Supreme Court not to investigate the anti-guerilla military operation in the Araguaia region in that period, as requested by families of the victims. The court cited the 1979 amnesty law in its decision.
In its ruling on Tuesday, the human rights court said, “The provisions of the Brazilian Amnesty Law that prevent the investigation and sanctioning of severe human rights violations are incompatible with the American Convention, have no legal effects and cannot continue to stand in the way of investigating the facts” of the Araguaia case.
On Wednesday, Paulo Vannuchi, Brazil’s departing minister for human rights, called the court’s decision “very important to continuing to develop human rights” in Brazil.
“We need to find the bodies of those resistance fighters and return them to their families,” Mr. Vannuchi said. “This is indispensable to talking about democratic reconciliation, about being one united country.”
Myrna Domit contributed reporting from São Paulo, Brazil.
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